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The purpose of this thesis is to provide information that
will assist in estimating the strengths and weaknesses of the
Soviet naval officer in future combat. This will be ac-
complished by: (1) examining the observations of senior
German military officers, who fought the Soviets in World War
II, on the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet's fighting
qualities during that conflict, and (2) examining the qualities
that are considered by the Soviet Navy today as being necessary
for victory in future combat.
The results of these two examinations will be compared so
as to provide some insight into the fighting qualities that
could be expected from the Soviet naval officer in combat.
This information when used in conjunction with intelligence
data will assist in estimating the strengths and weaknesses
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Chinese Army Commander [500 B.C.]
Sun Tzu
"However technically perfect the Navy may be, man is
always the basis of naval forces, the ruler of all the
weapons of warfare."
Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union
S.G. Gorshkov
When trying to prepare U.S. forces for possible military
operations against the Soviet Navy, it would be very valuable
to know how the Voyenno Morskoy Flot's (Soviet Navy or VMF)
officer would act in combat. There are several reasons for
this: (1) due to the increased speed and scope of modern war,
there is a much greater need for the ability to accurately
predict the actions of the enemy, (2) it would reduce the
uncertainty for U.S. decision makers during the command,
control, communications, and intelligence breakdowns that are
expected during modern war, and (3) it would allow for the greater
use of deception. In general, then, it could be said that
knowing how VMF Officer would act would materially
contribute to the United States ability to be victorious in
combat with the Soviet Navy and basically provide for better
U.S. national defense.

Unfortunately, it is neither possible to predict Soviet
combat performance absolutely, nor is it reasonable to expect
that it could be done with scientific precision. What can be
done, however, is to compile, examine, and evaluate, the
evidence that is available, which certainly is sufficient to
make meaningful estimates of what the VMF ' s officers' actions
in combat are most likely to be.
Making a prediction of this sort would be extremely dif-
ficult when evaluating any nation's military forces, but it is
exceptionally difficult when evaluating the military forces of
the Soviet Union. This is because of the closed nature of the
U.S.S.R. What this means is that there are numerous impediments
to the accumulation of accurate information about the Soviet
Union, and that very little meaningful information about the
U.S.S.R. is directly available. Perhaps the primary obstruction
to the acquisition of this information is the Soviet preoccu-
pation with secrecy. Due primarily to their historical
experiences, the Soviets have developed a concern that their
enemies would be able to use most any information about the
country against the Soviet Union. In order to thwart this
possibility, the Soviets engage in programs of partial infor-
mation and misinformation to confuse those studying their
country. Another problem is that the culture of the people in
the Soviet Union is in many ways different from the culture of
people who live in more Western nations. Because of this,
there is sometimes a difference between the Soviet: and Western

nations' perception of truth, which can frequently lead to
confusion and misunderstanding.
This, however, is not to say that gaining information about
the Soviets, and in particular about the Soviet Navy, is im-
possible, only that it is difficult and that every possible
approach must be utilized. To a very large extent, most infor-
mation about the VMF is circumstantial and gathered quite
tediously in painfully small amounts. These pieces are then
synthesized to form meaningful data. One method that is
currently being used to provide intelligence about the VMF is
inductive reasoning. By this method one can determine, for
example, what tactics a Soviet Naval vessel is likely to
employ from the capabilities of the weapons onboard. Another
method used is deductive reasoning. By this method one can
determine what Soviet strategy would be in a given area by
studying Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the topic. It needs to
be made quite clear, however, that the determinations made
about the Soviets, based on the available information, must
be made in the context of Soviet goals and life, and not
Western ideologies. This is a very difficult task, but one
which can be made somewhat easier by careful selection of the
sources of information, and a concerted effort to utilize
every possible piece of evidence when conducting the analysis.
The easiest way to determine how a VMF officer would act
in combat would be to watch him in action. This of course
is not possible since the last time the VMF was engaged in

actual combat was during World War II, and even the extent of
that was relatively limited. This problem is further com-
pounded by the fact that with the exception of one British
work on the Russo-Japanese War,* all the observations made
about the VMF in combat, by those other than Soviets, are of
the actions of the Soviet's "ships as a whole" and make few or no
references to the actions or qualities of the individuals who
made up the crew.**
Other methods that could be utilized in making estimates
about the Soviet naval officer's actions in future combat are:
(1) to observe and analyze his education, (2) to observe and
analyze the VMF ' s operations and exercises, (3) to observe and
analyze what the VMF writes on the topic of professional
performance and advancement, (4) to obtain and analyze what
the VMF plans to do in its official publications, orders,
manuals, plans, etc., (5) to analyze how the VMF designs and
constructs its aircraft, ships, submarines and associated
weapons systems, (6) to analyze composition and balance of
forces that comprise the VMF, and (7) to examine and analyze
*
The Historical Section of the Committee for Imperial
Defence, The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War
,
(London: Harrison and Son, 1910 )
.
**
For a clear and concise description of the Voyenno Morskoy
Flot '
s
actions in WWII against Germany see Vadm. Friedrich Ruge,
Federal German Navy (Ret.), The Soviets as Naval Opponents
,
Annapolis, MD : Naval Institute Press, 1979 . For a complete
history of the V.M.F. from 348 to 1943 see Mairin Mitchell,
The Maritime History of Russia
,









The research for this paper is going to be conducted by
using two of these methods: (1) to examine what the Soviets
write in their professional publications about what qualities
are necessary for a Soviet naval officer to possess in order
to be victorious in combat today, and (2) to examine the
observations made of the qualities exhibited by the Soviets
in combat during World War II. These two sources will provide
information that will allow for an estimate of what war fighting
qualities could be expected from the Soviet naval officer in
future combat.
The two Soviet professional publications that have been
chosen for examination are the (Soviet) Officer's Library
series and Morskoy Sbornik (Soviet Naval Digest) . While it
is certainly true that Soviet literature is very frequently
manipulated to accommodate the purpose of that writing, it
has become clear that certain vehicles of Soviet communication
are quite factual and can be accepted to mean exactly what
they say. The keys to the determination of which are not are
in the questions: (1) what is the purpose of the writing,
and (2) whom is it written for. In matters such as the pro-
fessional performance of their naval officers, there can be
no value derived in deceiving their own officers. Publications
that address topics such as this and carry direction to
subordinates of how to execute their professional duties seem
11

to be quite direct and telling. This is substantiated by the
fact that a comparison of the events taking place in the VMF
and the articles in Morskoy Sbornik show that VMF performance
reflects what is written in Morskoy Sbornik , and Morskoy Sbornik
reflects what is occurring in the Soviet Navy.
There are a number of reasons why it has been determined
valuable to examine the performance of the Soviet fighting man
in combat in World War II. One is that World War II was the
last conflict that the U.S.S.R. participated in and about
which substantial information is available. A second is that
the Soviets' are obsessed with the lessons of World War II
combat and study Soviet combat in the war very carefully.
Since the VMF considers World War II combat lessons to be
important, they are valuable to study, at least as a starting
point for estimating the warfighting qualities that could be
expected from the VMF officer in future combat. Finally, by
analyzing how the Soviets fought in World War II, great insight
will be provided into how the Soviets conceptualize war.
There are basically only three countries that have had
authors who addressed the history of Soviet combat action
during the Second World War: Great 3ritain, Germany, and the
U.S.S.R. itself. Of these three, the German works provide
greatest information about the qualities of the Soviet fighting
man in combat during the conflict and were consequently chosen
for examination. This was primarily because there is a very
large body of writings by quite senior German military cfficers
12
( •
who fought against the Soviets during World War II which
provides very detailed accounts of the German's combat actions
with the Soviets. Aside from the quantitative standpoint,
however, the quality of these German writings was also an
important factor in their choice. To begin with, they were
written in a timely manner, most within a year or two after
the war ended. Second, they were written by trained pro-
fessional military observers who had advanced to rather senior
and substantial positions in the German hierarchy. Third, they
are historically accurate with regard to information such as
times, dates, numbers of troops, battles, etc. Fourth, there
are multiple confirmations of the information in the German
works. Fifth, most are written from the position of pro-
fessional military officers who are debriefing a military
operation.
There were also some weaknesses in the German writings,
however, with the most salient one being that they were written
from a German point of view. By this is meant that they were
subject to whatever preconceptions or misconceptions the
authors had about the Soviets and also that they were written
by very senior military officers of a nation that the Soviet
Union just defeated. Also, they do contain some amount of
speculation.
Even when these shortcomings are taken into account through,
the German writings were well suited for the purpose of this
thesis. This is especially because with the authors coming from
13

a Western culture, they were probably sensitive to nuances of
Soviet actions in combat that Westerners would find interesting
even today, and also because they provide criticism of the
actions of both the Soviet and German performance which allows
for greater in-depth analysis than a strictly historical work.
Since the majority of the German writings address the
combat actions of Soviet Army during the war, the question
might be posed, "What is the value, of studying the Soviet
Army during the Second World War, when it is information about
the Soviet Navy that is being searched for?" The answer to
this question is threefold: (1) the Soviet High Command sees
great value in the lessons of Soviet combat in World War II
regardless of the service involved, and promulgates them to
all branches by way of vehicles such as the Officer's Library .
This is because they all see strong military principles as being
valuable to all services, (2) the role of the individual
service in Soviet military seem less distinct than is often
seen in Western nations simplifying thereby the transfer of
lessons learned by one service to the other services, and
(3) there is very little written about the combat actions of
the crews of the VMF ships in World War II. Most writing is
in the terms of the movements of ships. Hence the study of
the combat qualities of Soviet Army personnel in World War II
may be the closest one can come to gaining insight into the
qualities of Soviet Naval personnel. The assumption is made
in short, that to some extent, Soviets are Soviets or Russians
are Russians, whatever the service.
14

By studying and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
observed in the performance of the Soviet fighting man in
combat during World II, and comparing them with the combat-
related qualities the senior VMF officers inculcate in their
officers today, one can estimate some possible strengths and
weaknesses of the VMF officer in future combat.




II. GERMAN OBSERVATIONS OF SOVIET FIGHTING CHARACTERISTICS
DURING WORLD WAR II
"...the reports by these German commanders of their oper-
ations are proving not only to be reliable, but the only
information that we will have as to what occurred. . .
"
Dwight D. Eisenhower
U.S. Army Chief of Staff,
30 August 19 4 7
Experience shows that the Russian soldier has an almost
incredible ability to stand up to the heaviest artillery
fire and air-bombardment, while the Russian Command
remains unmoved by the bloodiest losses caused by shelling
and bombs, and ruthlessly adheres to its preconceived
plans. Russian lack of reaction to even the heaviest
shelling was proven repeatedly ... it must be expected that






When hostilities in Europe came to an end in 1945, the
U.S. Army had no plans for any major historical projects
involving enemy commanders or enemy senior staff officers.
The German Military History Program began quite fortuitously
in mid-July, 1945, when the American European Theater Historian,
Colonel S. L. Marshall, sent a member of his Paris staff,
Major K. W. Hechler , to the Luxemberg prison camp for top
German leaders to talk to the P.O.W. 's and obtain whatever
information he could. By the end of the month, Hechler had
returned to Paris with reports on a wide range of questions
answered by people such as Admirals Doenitz and Wagner, and
Marshals Goering, Keitel, and Kesseiring.
16

The value of these reports was immediately obvious, and
soon the U.S. European Theater Historical Division was tasked
with the mission of compiling as complete a record as possible
of all German military operations against United States forces
in the European Theater. During the seventeen years that this
program was functioning (1945-1961) , over twenty-five hundred
manuscripts and pamphlets were assembled (over two hundred
thousand pages) and are now primarily maintained in the
National Archives in Washington, D.C.
The majority of the manuscripts developed under the German
Military History Program were the direct result of interviews
with very senior German military officers shortly after the
war ended. As a follow-on to these manuscripts, the Department
of the Army compiled numerous pamphlets, combining and editing
into a more academic form the information obtained during the
original interviews with the German officers. This program
eventually expanded so as to cover all theaters of the war in
which Germany fought. This expansion allowed for the production
of three hundred and forty-five manuscripts and pamphlets on
the German experience in the Soviet Union between 19 41 and
1945.*
*
For a complete explanation of the German Military History
Program and a listing and brief synopsis of all twenty-five
hundred manuscripts and pamphlets produced by the program, see
Donald S. Detwiler, ed. , World War II German Military Studies
,
Vol. I, New York: Garland Publishing, 19 79.
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In 19 79, a twenty-four volume series edited by Donald S.
Detwiler, Charles B. Burdick, and Jurgen Rohwer and entitled
World War II German Military Studies was published. This
series contains copies of two hundred and thirteen original
manuscripts and pamphlets alleged to be a quite representative
selection of the total twenty-five hundred manuscripts and
pamphlets developed through German Military History Program.*
Fifty-five of these are about German combat with the Soviets
during the war.
Almost all of the original three hundred and forty-five
works about the Eastern Front were taken into account in the
series, either through direct inclusion, or through inclusion
of Department of the Army pamphlets that combined the infor-
mation recorded in many of the original manuscripts into more
unified sources.
It is from the detailed accounts in both the German manu-
scripts and the Army pamphlets contained in the World War II
Military Studies series that the information on the professional
performance of the Soviet fighting man in combat with the
Germans was drawn. The writer read sixty-one of these
*
Editor Charles Burdick, who worked on some of the original
manuscripts, stated in one interview that he had read all the
manuscripts and pamphlets from the German Military History
Program and that he was very confident that the works chosen
for the World War II German Military Studies series did
accurately represent the twenty-five hundred manuscripts and
pamphlets from the German Military History Program. A review
of the synopsis for all of the manuscripts and pamphlets from




manuscripts and reviewed all twenty-five hundred, and noted
each time a warfighting quality was indicated in the manuscript.
In all there were twenty-seven specific adjectives or de-
scriptors mentioned, and this writer combined most of the most
frequently mentioned ones into five general or broad qualities:
(1) his ability to learn and improve his combat performance,
(2) his initiative, (3) the value he placed on human life,
(4) his physical strengths and needs, and (5) his motivations
to fight.*
The effect on combat performance of these five general
war fighting qualities of the Soviet fighting man will be the
subject of the remainder of this chapter. German writings
stated that these five qualities were innate in the Soviet
fighting man and that they affected greatly the Soviet ability
to withstand the German offensive during the first year of the
war. [Ref. 73] It is interesting to note, especially in light
The Qualities of the Soviet fighting man in World War II
which were addressed in the German manuscripts are that he
was: 1) able to survive situations the Germans could not;
2) afraid or unable to take independent action; 3) brave/
courageous; 4) a coward; 5) cunning in some areas; 6) discip-
lined; 7) dull in some areas; 3) easily lead; 9) feared
failure; 10) frugal; 11) little apparent regard for human life
12) loved "Mother Russia"; 13) motivated by fear, love,
example and hate; 14) subject to herd instinct; 15) strong
constitution; 16) self-sufficient; 17) predictable; 18) un-
trained; 19) unpredictable; 20) unprepared for the German
invasion; 21) used every means to fight; 22) very obedient -
did not ask questions; 23) senior officers were flexible;
24) senior officers were energetic; 25) senior officers had
initiative; 26) senior officers had foresight; 27) senior





of the emphasis the Soviets place on the lessons learned in
combat during World War II, that some of these very same
qualities are, among others, still being addressed by the VMF
in their writings today. The relationship of these qualities
to the VMF today and in the future will be addressed in the
final chapter.
A. THE ABILITY TO LEARN AND IMPROVE
The ability of a combatant to learn and to improve his
combat performance over the duration of a conflict is a
valuable asset to his command. German writings provide numer-
ous examples of positive change in the combat performance of
the Soviet Army over the duration of the war that indicates
improvement in that performance.* It is difficult, however,
to demonstrate unequivocally how much of the change in combat
performance was due to the Soviet's ability to learn and
improve. In part, this is because it is difficult to ascertain
whether the Soviet victory was due to an improvement in the
Soviet performance in combat, a worsening in the German
performance in combat, or how much a combination of both.
Despite the regard the Wehrmacht gained for the Soviet
Army during their pre-World War II exercises in the U.3.S.R.,
the German high command had no difficulty in recognizing the
catastrophic effects of the Purges on the Soviet military.
*See References: [30: p. 93], [32: pp. 107,112], [62




[Ref. 10: p. 1] The realization that the old guard of the Red
Army, whose view of war was not nearly as modern as their
purged predecessors, were now in control, only added to the
German high command's tendency to consider their Slavic
opponents as the inferior contestant in their upcoming en-
gagement. An indicator of this was the fact that the Wehrmacht
invaded the Soviet Union (1941 population of about 180 million)
with at best, twenty-five fewer divisions than the Soviets
already had in their standing army. [Ref. 31: p. 1-15] German
writings indicate that the Wehrmacht maintained this attitude
of viewing the Soviets as infererior at least through the
Summer of 1942, partly because of the unorthodox methods that
the Soviets employed.* This seemed to change, however, as the
war progressed and the Germans began to gain a greater appreci-
ation for the ways of the Russian in combat:
Fighting the Russian on his own ground necessitated ori-
entation in a new type of combat. Fighting had to be
primitive and unscrupulous, but rapid and flexible. The
German could never afford to hesitate, even in the face
of the most surprising occurrences and unexpected turns
of events. Russian reaction to the tactical rules war-
fare, and to the tricks of the trade such as development,
flanking threat, feint, surprise, etc., could never be
determined beforehand. One time the Russian would act
according to the rules and give up sooner than anticipated;
on another occasion all efforts were to no avail, and
neither encirclement for flanking attack fazed him. The
struggle with the Russians was thereby placed on an
entirely new basis; predictive calculation was useless,
and every action was full of suspense and surprise. At
times, positions which were tactically decisive according
to normal concepts would be evacuated by the Russians
without delay. At other times, individual terrain features







of no evident importance would be held even in the face
of the most serious losses. In those instances the
Russian often only relied only on his intuition, which
he substituted for his practical schooling. It must be
conceded that this tactical instinct often stood the
Russians in better stead than the theories of many
academies could have done. .
.
Thus the Russian soldier avoided a number of tactical
principles. Still, others were altered because of the
nature of the country itself.... [Ref. 62: pp. 28-29]
The fact that the Germans did not understand these points
at the outset of the war seems to have been a contributing
factor in Germany losing the momentum they had in the Soviet
Union during the first six months after the invasion.
Evidence shows that there were several reasons for the
change in the Soviet combat performance, all of which played
a part in their ultimate victory ever Germany. Seme of these
are: (1) the Soviets learned from their own mistakes, (2) the
Soviets learned from observing the actions of the Wehrmacht,
(3) the Soviet Army was able to successfully reorganize itself
to almost pre-19 37 conditions by the summer of 19 42, (4) the
conscripted Soviet fighting man gained valuable combat
experience; (5) the Germans overextended themselves, (6) the
Germans were insufficiently prepared for both the Soviet way
of fighting and the Russian winter, and (7) the Wehrmacht had
to contend with political interference from Berlin. None of
these reasons individually could be considered the singularly
decisive factor in the Soviet's victory on the Eastern front,
but together they provide some basis for why the Soviet's
combat record went from one of primarily defeat in the
22

beginning of the war, to ultimately a sound victory over the
invading Germans. Further, an understanding of the combat
actions that reflect these reasons, and the difficulties the
change in the Soviet's combat performance caused the Wehrmacht,
also provide a good indication of why the Soviets find such
great value in the lessons of their World War II combat for
their armed forces today.
The remainder of this section will present expressed German
views on the Soviet fighting man's ability to learn and to
improve his combat performance. In order to do this it will
be useful to divide the war into two basic sections: (1) pre-
battle of Moscow (spring of '41 to fall of '41) and (2) post-
battle of Moscow (spring of '42 to spring of '45) and describe
the combat actions of the Soviets in both. This division has
been chosen because the Germans have presented the Battle of
Moscow as the turning point of the war where the Soviet Army
went on the offensive. [Ref. 36: p. 228], [Ref. 62: p. 39]
1. Pre-3attle of Moscow
At 300 on 22 June, 19 41, the German invasion of the
Soviet Union began. Despite all indications of German in-
tentions
,
the Russians seemed to have been unaware of the
danger massing on their western border. In some places the
Russians were caught sleeping and in many instances Russian
commanders proved helpless before the onslaught. During the
first eight days of the attack, the Soviets had some twenty
divisions destroyed, and over 290,000 prisoners, 2,500 tanks,
23

and 1,400 guns captured. [Ref. 31: p. 3] By October, 1941
it is estimated that the Soviets had lost about three million
men counting K.I.A.'s, M.I. A. 's, P.O.W. 's, and W.I.A.'s.*
[Ref. 144]
The inability of the Soviets to have avoided losses
of this magnitude seems to have primarily stemmed from the
disruption of Soviet military system that resulted from the
Purges. This disorganization contributed to the Soviet's
original inability to repel the Germans at the border, which
then compounded into greater and greater losses, as the number
of trained Soviet troops decreased through attrition.
Because of these reasons, the Soviets were forced to
attempt to deter the rapid eastern advances of the Wehrmacht
by any method, they could. Their predicament of having to
combat highly trained German soldiers with newly conscripted
Soviet soldiers further increased the Soviet High Command's
problems. This lack of trained manpower to fight with seems
to have at least in part contributed to the lack of flexibility
the Germans observed in the Soviet combat performance especially
during the first six months of the war. [Ref. 73: p. 3]
Two of the Soviet combat characteristics that the
Germans commented on, which indicated rigidity in the Soviet's
combat performance, were the Soviet's inflexibility and lack





stubbornness and tenacity in most defensive situations. [Ref.
62: p. 58] There were of course exceptions to these general-
izations, and they most frequently coincided with: (1) a
situation when the German action surprised the Soviets , and
(2) an increase in the level of the Soviet combat experience.*
Although both of these generalized characteristics were observed
throughout the war, German writings indicate that they were
present to a lesser extent during the latter years of the
hostilities. The following are examples of these character-
istics and exceptions as described in the German manuscripts.
Example 1. In July and August of 19 41 the 6th Panzer
Division succeeded in effecting a surprise capture of two
bridges crossing the Iuga River at Porechye [sixty miles
southwest of Leningrad] . In support of the German observation
of the Soviets being "inflexible and unadaptable in attack"
the following account is presented:
[Because of Soviet inflexibility] the German force was
able to stand its ground against an enemy six times as
strong, despite the fact that it could no longer be
reached or supported by aircraft. In unobserved fire,
the Russians sent more than two thousand medium shells
a day in the direction of the bridges without ever
hitting them. . .As often as ten times a day the enemy
attacked the road fork which was enclosed by the pro-
jecting arc of the bridgehead. Each attack was headed
by as many tanks, echeloned in depth, as the narrow
area would accommodate. Time and again the enemy
attacks were repulsed, and time and again they were
renewed. Wave after wave of Russian forces assembled,
*




concealed by many wrecked tanks and heaps of corpses, and
stormed recklessly into the murderous defensive fire.
The attacks did not subside until the enemy no longer had
the necessary men and ammunition at his disposal. Soon
however, replacements of proletarians and new ammunition
supplies arrived from Leningrad. The assaults on the road
fork were stubbornly and incessantly resumed until passage
through the narrow attack corridors was no longer possible
because they were completely clogged with disabled enemy
tanks and decaying heaps of corpses. Later we counted
more than two thousand dead Russians and seventy-eight
knocked out enemy tanks in this narrow combat zone alone.
[Ref. 62: p. 42]
Example 2. As mentioned earlier, the Wehrmacht officers
interviewed during the U.S. Army study, agreed in general with
the observation of the Soviets being "stubborn and tenacious
in defense." The following description of the Russian's
performance in a defensive situation is indicative of the
majority of the German writings on this topic.
In mid-September Russian infantry supported by tanks
seized Hill 726, some ten miles north of Olenino [one
hundred and fifty miles west of Moscow] . Once the
Russians had wrested it from the Germans, they withdrew
their tanks and left an infantry company of about
seventy- five men to defend the newly won position. This
hill now constituted a dent in the German lines and
afforded a sweeping view of the German rear area, thus
hampering movements . .
.
The Russian defense system on the hill was not organized
in a continuous line, but rather in the form of strong
points . .
.
[German ] Company G made five or six attempts to retake
Hill 726, but failed,* in each case the attack was halted
at the very beginning because of heavy casualties in-
curred from mines and massed mortar fire. The Russians
defended the hill with extreme tenacity. The company
commander, Captain Viehmann, observed that the Russians
confined their activity to the hours of darkness.
During the day their positions appeared deserted.
Russian reconnaissance patrols were very active, but
only between midnight and dawn.
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The Russians defended the hill with extreme tenacity. .
.
[Several days later] while German troops diverted the
enemy's attention by sudden shouting, the assault elements
attacked and penetrated the Russian mine belt through two
previously identified gaps... The defending Russians were
taken completely by surprise .. .Nevertheless the Russians
did not give way to panic or abandon their positions, but
struggled to the bitter end. After about an hour of
brutal hand-to-hand fighting the entire hill was in German
hands, as were the surviving twenty Russians. [Ref. 26:
pp. 40-44]
Example 3. There were also situations when the Germans
observed the Soviets as not being tenacious on defense. In
these cases, which primarily occurred during the beginning
months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans
observed the Soviets as being easily confused and routed, as
exhibited in the following combat actions:
The following observations were given of an incident
at the city of Antelevo, [just south of Leningrad] in September
of 1941, during the skirmish for Hill 312:
...However [during this battle] the Russians lost all
enthusiasm for an attack after the German artillery
lobbed a few well-aimed shells into their midst... The
Russians had apparently considered these particular
bunkers impregnable, for once they were destroyed, the
enemy (Russian) infantry fled in wild disorder, abandoning
most of its equipment. By nightfall, Antelevo was secure
in German hands
.
The flight of the Antelevo garrison was indicative of how
easily the Russians became demoralized when they were con-
fronted with an unexpected situation. When the German's
blew up the bunkers, the Russians panicked and instinctively
took to flight, as happened so often during the early
months of the campaign. [Ref. 32: pp. 13-15]
These three examples provided an indication of some
of the types of combat performance that the Germans observed
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on the part of the uniformed Soviet Army, to the greatest
extent during the first year of the war.
Eefore the Soviet fighting man gained his combat
experience, German writings indicate that there were certain
qualities that he exhibited, that helped carry him through the
extremely difficult first six months of the war. These
qualities will be discussed in the next four sections of this
chapter, but before that is done, the post-Battle of Moscow
period will be addressed here.
2 . Post-Battle of Moscow
The Battle of Moscow was seen by the Wehrmacht as
being the turning point of the war. It was Moscow that the
Soviets were finally able to begin to reorganize their forces,
and utilize trained Soviet troops from the eastern frontier
in conjunction with the inhabitants of that city, to defeat
the Germans for the first time in a major battle since the
war began. [Ref. 142]
After Moscow, there were still almost another six
months of poor combat performance on the part of the Soviets.
This seems most probably due to the fact that the majority of
the Soviets in combat during that period were conscripts with
minimal combat experience and the organizational problems of
the Soviet Army in general. German reports show, however,
that after that time the Soviets began to employ tactics that
the Germans viewed as more productive, sensible and flexible
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than the ones the Soviets employed earlier on in the fighting,
as seen in the following: [Ref. 81: p. 29]
The performance of the Russian unit leaders improved gradu-
ally. Whereas at the beginning of the campaign Russian
commanders often demonstrated a lack of initiative and
resoluteness, they executed many very daring manuvers
toward the end of the war. During the initial phase of
the campaign they often failed to exploit an opening,
but their conduct of operation gradually improved so
much that eventually they were able to score major
victories. [Ref. 81: p. 27]
The two examples that follow are taken from German
manuscripts to show that some amount of the success in combat
of the Soviet fighting man that could be observed as the war
progressed was due to his ability to assimilate the lessons of
his previous combat experiences and to apply them in a
productive manner.
Example 1. Earlier in this section an example was
given that typified the Soviet tactic of the continual use of
mass force, and it showed how costly it was to the Soviets.
In the following example, the Germans observed the Soviets
using a different tactic, one which was not only fruitful, but
also conserved Soviet lives and assets , in contrast to the
blunt attack (as exemplified in the cite en page 25 where the
Soviets engaged in wave attacks). Note that it took place
during the summer of 19 4 2 while the Germans were attempting
to advance toward Glinnaya:
After elements of the 19th Panzer Division had pushed
through Nikitzkoye they ran into trouble north of the
town, where they were repeatedly attacked by groups of
five to seven Russian tanks emerging from the large
forrest adjacent to the division's left flank. After
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allowing the German armored point to pass, the Russian
tanks pounced on the wheeled vehicles that followed.
Whenever the German tanks counter-attacked, the Russian
tanks immediately withdrew into the forest, only to
emerge at another point. The tanks used in this oper-
ation were of an older type, no match for their German
counterparts in open terrain. Hence the Russians used
them - and with telling effect - only for hit and run
operations. These Russian tactics cost the Germans a
large number of casualties and caused considerable delay.
[Ref. 32: pp. 111-112]
Example 2. In the following example, the Germans
note that even though the Soviets in this case were forced to
retreat, it was accomplished in a "military" fashion of which
they approved and one which was substantially different from
Soviet actions observed early in the War. This engagement
took place near Orel (two hundred miles southwest of Moscow)
during the summer of 194 3. These types of improvements on
the part of the Soviets continued to take place until the end
of the War.
*
It appears that the enemy officers and non-commissioned
officers were briefed in detail on what the Russian oper-
ations were going to be in case of a German attack...
This conclusion is supported by the fact that a sand
table was found in the woods where the headquarters of a
major Russian unit had its command post. Besides, one
could easily tell that Russian operations had been pre-
pared carefully from the fact that there were no signs
of disorder and no indications of a hasty retreat on the
part of the Russians. There were no radioed SOS-calls,
so frequently intercepted in the past... [Ref. 30: pp.
92-93]
These two examples provide several tactical reasons
why the Soviets realized greater success in combat as the War
*
For other examples see References [32: pp. 107,112],





progressed: (1) greater utilization of tactics that conserved
Soviet assets (particularly troops) , (2) better utilization of
assets to fit the tactical situation, and (3) better advanced
planning that provided contingency orders. In their writings
the Germans address several other tactical reasons that were
considered to have contributed to the increased success of the
Soviets in combat. Some of them were: (1) the Soviets began
to realize the consequences of their misuse of the radio, and
as they discontinued disclosing their plans on the air, it
was much more difficult for the Germans to predict what the
Soviet intentions were, [Ref. 30, p. 93], [Ref. 79, p. 17],
(2) the Russians began to act in a much bolder manner, es-
pecially after the summer of 1944, thereby exploiting situations
that would have been missed earlier in the war, [Ref. 73:
p. 16], (3) the performance of the lower and middle echelon
officers improved gradually over the duration of the War,
allowing him to conduct operations that he would have pre-
viously been incapable of, [Ref. 81: p. 27], (4) the Soviet
High Command became more flexible and began to adopt the
German tactics which were more mobile than the earlier Soviet
tactics. They also became less rigid in their planning, and
more Soviet flexibility was observed by the Germans in the
field, [Ref. 31: p. 29], (5) there was a substantial improvement
in the coordination and cooperation between Soviet units,
especially artillery and infantry, which allowed for far
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greater successes than the units were able to accomplish
individually. [Ref. 62: p. 47]*
As for the Soviet fighting man's ability to learn from
his combat experiences and thus improve his performance in
combat, the results still seem to be unquantif iable. However,
the fact that one is unable to define precisely how much the
Soviet fighting man's combat performance improved over the
duration of the war, does not detract from the fact that
improvement was observed. Neither should the fact that the
Wehrmacht was in a degraded condition when the Soviets began
to win with the least effort.
That the Soviet's enemies observed and recorded
numerous improvements in Soviet combat performance is salient.
To conclude that a portion of that observed improved combat
performance was due to the Soviet fighting man's ability to
learn and improve from his combat experience is certainly
reasonable.
German writings indicate that the improvement of the
Soviet fighting man's combat performance seems to have made
a significant contribution to the Soviet's ability to expel
the German forces from the USSR. Evidence further suggests
that during the postwar period the Soviets became quite aware
*
Some German writers also made the point, most emphatically,
that the increase in Soviet success was primarily due to the
German's weakened condition. [Ref. 73, pp. 1-3] Although this
is certainly true, it must be remembered that the Germans would
not have been in that weakened condition had not the Soviets
fought as strongly as they had early on in the conflict.

of just how costly their lack of preparation for combat at the
time of the German invasion was [Ref. 73: pp. 22-29]. This
then can be viewed as one of the substantial lessons the Soviets
learned from World War II and provides a strong indication of
why the Soviets are so intent on combat readiness and are now
insuring that they accomplish their training before the next
conflict starts.
B. INITIATIVE
The ability of a fighting man to act independently and to
have initiative is of great value to this command. The German
manuscripts however, often focused on the lack of initiative
of the Soviet fighting man in combat at all but the highest
levels. About these officers the Germans wrote:
The higher echelons* of Russian command proved capable
from the very beginning of the war and learned a great
deal more during its course. They were flexible, full of
initiative, and energetic. . .The extraordinary industry
with which these commanders went about their duties was
characteristic. Every day and far into the night they
sat together to discuss and to record in writing what
they had seen and heard during the day. [Ref. 62: p. 8]
At all levels below this, however, the lack of initiative
appeared to be painfully clear. It should be noted though
that in their writings the Germans indicated that they believed
the Soviet High Command saw this lack of initiative not only
as a short-coming, but also as a quality to be capitalized on.
[Ref. 32: p. 2] The following section will address the
In their writings the Germans defined Soviet Higher Echelon
Commands as Army, Army Group and above; Intermediate Echelon
Commands as Division Level; and Lower Echelon Commands as those
below Division Level. [Ref. 62: d. 12]
33

quality of initiative in combat observed in the Soviet fighting
man by the Germans in World War II.
For the most part, the Soviet's observed lack of initiative
and the way he allowed himself to be controlled was attributed
to being a national characteristic by most of the German
officers who addressed this topic. [Ref. 72: pp. 1-2] The
following observation of Generaloberst (four star general)
Erhard Raus is indicative of the opinion of many of his fellow
Wehrmacht officers and seems to say three things: (1) that
the common Soviet soldier lacked initiative, (2) that the
Soviet Army's leadership was quite capable throughout the war
and improved as the war progressed, and (3) the Soviet Army's
leadership were unable to inspire the common soldier.
The Russian infantryman was a member of the herd, pre-
fering to fight in concert with others rather than to
be left to his own devices. In the attack this was
evidenced in the massed lines, sometimes almost packs;
in the defense it was shown by the stubbornly resisting
bunker complements. Here there was no individual action...
[However] the higher echelons of Russian command proved
capable from the very beginning of the war and learned
a great deal more during its course. They were flexible,
full of initiative, and energetic. However, they were
unable to inspire the mass of Russian soldiers. [Ref. 62:pp 8,17]
The German manuscripts also provide numerous examples of what
the Wehrmacht considered an apparent lack of initiative on
the part of the lower and mid to upper echelon Soviet combatant
as seen in the following account. It should be noted however,
that the frequency of such accounts seemed to decrease as the
war progressed.
Rogachev is a medium size Soviet industrial center three
hundred miles southwest of Moscow, on the Dnepr River. On
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15 July, 1941 the German LIII Corps attacked this city, and
the following account of the incident was given by Generaloberest,
Dr., (four star general, Ph.D) Lothar Rendulic, who commanded
the 52d Infantry Division of the German LIII Corp during the
attack.
The 26 7th Infantry Division was approaching Rogachev from
the west. . .Although the area north of the combat zone was
completely unprotected, and the initiative entirely with
the Russians (who outnumbered the Germans three to two)
,
they attempted no encirclement or envelopment, but
launched one frontal attack after another. A flanking
maneuver with a small force, even a battalion, would have
been very effective, but the frontal attack was the
typically Russian manner of conducting the operation.
The enemy failed to consider any other possibilities
which would have required a certain amount of initiative.
During the night from 15 to 16 July, the 52d Division. .
.
pivoted south and on the morning of 16 July (after having
been on the march for twenty four hours) arrived 12km.
north of the combat zone... The Russians had to expect
that this division would participate in the fighting. It
was important to prevent it (52d Division) from taking
part in the operations west of Rogachev. This could only
be accomplished by attacking and defeating the 52d Div-
ision. If the Russians temporarily suspended their
current attack and held their gains with one division,
they would still have two divisions available for this
operation. However, a quick change in plans was not in
line with their ability. The rapid assembly of forces
and the organization of an attack against the enemy from
the north would have required flexibility of thought and
initiative. Such requirements exceeded the capabilities
of the [local] Russian command and besides, a decision
of this kind doubtlessly would have required the approval
of various higher headquarters. The slowness of the
Russian mind would have caused an endless delay. In-
stead of making the correct decision, the Russians
continued their frontal attack. . .This to them was the
most simple and most primitive solution, which required
little imagination and initiative. They had come to
the worst possible solution. As a result, my Division
launched an attack at noon, overran and annihilated the
Russian defenses of one division, and rolled-up the
Russian front in a flanking attack to the south; even
[Russian] units which had not participated in the
Russian offensive were destroved. This attack decided
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the battle west of Rogechev. . . It was an especially great
disadvantage for the Russians that their infantry, after
achieving a penetration, did not immediately exploit its
advantage by pushing forward, but rather waited the
preparation of a new attack; this afforded the opponent
time to take countermeasures . . .This methodical and
unimaginative procedure cost the Russians many a victory. .
.
[Ref. 73: pp. 5-6, 27]
The German manuscripts are full of similar descriptions
of Soviet performance in combat which clearly indicates a
lack of ability on the part of the lower and mid to upper
level Soviet soldier to take independent action that deviated
from his specific orders, regardless of how obvious the value
of the deviation.* The manuscripts also very clearly indicate,
however, that strict compliance with orders and reliance on
direction from above were most highly desired qualities fostered
by the Soviet High Command, prompted to some degree by the
lack of combat experienced Soviet troops at the beginning of
the war. [Ref. 14 4] In their writings, the Germans provided
numerous examples of how the Soviets achieved and maintained
this quality in their subordinates.
There seems to have been two primary ways the Soviet High
Command accomplished this: (1) to drill the principle of
strict compliance with orders into every Soviet soldier, and
(2) to insure that every Soviet had it absolutely clear in
his mind that the punishment for failure to obey was death.
This "punishment" was usually meted out by the unit's
*
For other examples see References: [15: Dp. 233-234],
[52: pp. 13-17,37,76,107,112], [62: pp. 3-12,16,41, Ch . 10],
[73: pp. 5-9,27], [81: pp. 20,28].
36

commissar (political officer) , and the frequency of this type
of punishment seems to be indicated by the remark of General
Petrov, the commander of the Fiftieth Army, to the Fiftieth
Army Commissar: "Well, how many [Russian soldiers] have you
shot today?" [Ref. 62: p. 13]
To clarify any confusion that might arise, this type of
punishment was by no means intended solely for the enlisted
man. In the manuscripts it can be, quite clearly be seen as
applying to all but a very select few who had the power and
influence to protect themselves.
The following is an observation made by Generallieutenant
de Waffen-SS Max Simon:*
...but in all my years of experience [with the Soviets]
the repeat attacks did not depart a single time from the
pattern of the first attack. The Russian officer's lack
of flexibility, which has been mentioned previously, was
aggravated by the fact that they were always held
personally responsible for failures. [Ref. 79: p. 18]
The implication here seems to be that the lower grade
Soviet officers would choose to follow their orders precisely,
regardless of the results, rather than risk the chance of
being blamed for their failure. If they were following orders
and failed , there appears to have been a hope that they would
not have been held responsible, since they were only following
*
This observation should not be construed as to detract
from the point made in the previous section about the Soviet's
combat performance improving. Generallieutenant Simon left
the Eastern Front for the last time in the fall of 19 4 3 ,,
therefore having no first hand knowledge of the Soviet's
fighting qualities during the last twenty months of the war.
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orders. The German observation was that some portion of this
situation was caused by the Soviet military system:
The flexibility demonstrated by the higher commands
,
(army and army group) was not evident at lower levels.
The lower command echelons, (below division level) of
the Russian Army, and for the most part also the inter-
mediate echelons, (generally division level) remained
for a long period inflexible and indecisive, avoiding
all personal responsibility. The rigid pattern of
training and a too strict discipline so narrowly confined
the lower command within a framework of existing regu-
lations that the result was lethargy. Spirited appli-
cation to a task, born of the decision of an individual,
was a rarity. Russian elements that had broken through
German lines could remain for days behind the front
without recognizing their favorable position and taking
advantage of it. The Russian small unit commander's
fear of doing something wrong and being called to account
for it was greater than the urge to take advantage of a
situation.
The commanders of Russian combined arms units were often
well trained along tactical lines, but to some extent
they had not grasped the essence of tactical doctrines
and therefore often acted according to set patterns, not
according to circumstances. Also there was the pronounced
spirit of blind obedience which had perhaps carried over
from their regimented civilian life into the military
field. Thus, for example, toward the end of September of
1941, in the area southwest of Bryansk, the same sector
was attacked by various Russian battalions every day for
seven days running without any apparent reason and without
success, but with severe losses. Finally, a captured
battalion commander supplied the explanation. In looking
through some old files a new regimental commander had
found a top-level order to the effect that continuous
attacks were to be made along the entire front in order
to ease the pressure on Leningrad. Since he had received
a negative reply to his inquiry as to whether these
attacks had already been made , he had ordered this sector
attacked every day. In the meantime, however, 2 months
had passed [since the order had been issued] , and the
pressure on Leningrad had long since been relieved.
[Ref. 62: p. 12]
This type of performance in combat may seem to be scmewha -1
incomprehensible, especially from a regimental commander,, but
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the following instance, related by Generaloberst Raus
,
emphasizing the cost of failing to obey his orders to a
Soviet tank company commander, may serve to clarify the point:
In the fighting east of Roslavl [250 miles southwest of
Moscow] in August, 1941, a Russian tank company that had
been sent into action suddenly stopped on the battlefield.
The leader of the tank company had received an order
before going into action to refuel at a fuel depot some-
what to the rear of his bivouac area. He did not, how-
ever, want to take the trouble to go back as he thought
that it would be possible to refuel further forward at
the divisional command post nearer the front. Eut there
was no opportunity to refuel at that point. The tank
company just reached the battlefield and then ground to
a halt because of lack of fuel. Thereupon the company
commissar drew his pistol and shot the commanding officer
on the spot. [Ref. 63: p. 15]
This type of treatment of officers implies a tremendous
inducement for all to follow orders to the letter, and
certainly seems to reinforce the point that an individual
had everything to lose and nothing to gain by trying to think
for himself.
There seems to also be another reason for lack of inde-
pendent action on the part of the lower and middle echelon
Soviet that may drawn from this example, that is insufficient
information to act intelligently. The maintenance of strict
security by a country during wartime is quite expected, and
the policy of the Soviet's to maintain secrecy with regard
to their plans and assets is not difficult to understand.
However, when the policy is carried to such extremes so as
to interfere with the nation's military's ability to function
in a proper manner it can be assumed that there is a problem.
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In the case of the Soviet Union in World War II, it was per-
haps even an indication of a distrust for their own men. The
extremes to which this policy of total secrecy was carried by
the Soviets is indicated by, (1) the incredible penalties
paid for simply losing an unmarked, non-tactical, Soviet map
[Ref. 36: p. 266], and (2) the way that Soviet fighting men
who were POWs were automatically assumed to have corraborated
with the Germans and were treated as traitors upon their return
to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 48: p. 7]
A point can be made that perhaps there were some reasons
for the Soviets to maintain these policies, but the fact still
remains that the Soviet policy of providing their subordinates
with minimum information undoubtedly contributed to the Soviet
fighting man's lack of initiative in combat during World War
II.
In recapping what has already been discussed in this
section it can be said that there are at least three possible
reasons that can be given for the Soviet's observed lack of
initiative: (1) because it is a natural tendency for the
Soviet fighting man to be passive and to allow himself to be
controlled, (2) because of insufficient training and combat
experience of the Soviet fighting man, especially during the
first year of war, the Soviet High Command determined that
they did not want their subordinants to take any initiative,
and enforced this position with the threat of death, and
(3) because of not having knowledge of what the High Command's
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plan was beyond his immediate mission, the lower level Soviet
fighting man usually didn't have sufficient information to
make intelligent independent judgements.
The fact that these three reasons complement each other
somewhat complicates the ability to determine whether the
Soviet fighting man in WWII truely lacked the ability to take
initiative in combat or was simply following orders. However,
the German observations did depict the Soviet combat performance
as improving over the duration of the conflict, and attributing
that improvement, in part, to the more flexible and productive
actions of the lower and middle level Soviet officers. It is
interesting to note that there also seems to be a correlation
between the increase in the amount of combat experience of
the lower level Soviet, his improved performance in combat,
and the increased latitude he was allowed in his actions.*
In the following section another quality of the Soviet
fighting man in combat during World War II will be addressed.
This one, however, will be one that the Germans presented as
being more valuable in achieving victory or avoiding defeat
to the Soviet High Command. It is the value the Soviet
placed on human life.
The change in the experience and attitude of the Soviet




C. THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
Of all the qualities that the Germans observed of the
Soviet in combat, the one that was clearly presented as the
most shocking and unbelievable to the Wehrmacht officers was
the Soviet's apparent disregard for human life.* The following
quote from General Major F.W. von Mellenthin seems to elo-
quently and suscinctly summarize the other German observations
on this topic:
The stoicism of the majority of Russian soldiers and their
mental sluggishness makes them quite insensitive to losses.
The Russian soldier values his own life no more than those
of his comrades. To step on walls of dead, composed of
the bodies of his former friends makes not the slightest
impression on him and does not upset his equanimity at
all; without twinkling an eyelid he stolidly continues
the attack or stays put in the position he has been told
to defend. Life is not precious to him. He is immune to
the most incredible hardships, and does not even appear
to notice them; he seems equally indifferent to bombs
and shells. Naturally, there are Russian soldiers of a
more tender physical and psychological structure, but
they have been trained to execute orders to the letter
and without hesitation. [Ref. 15: p. 233]
As with the previously discussed quality of initiative,
there is a belief among the German writers that the low value
the Soviet fighting man places on life was an inherent trait.
Generaloberest Dr. Rendulic in his manuscript, "The Fighting
Qualities of the Russian Soldier", presents himself as a
German manuscripts give no indication that the Soviet's
apparent disregard for life was based on any fanaticism;
religious, political, or otherwise. In fact one account
specifically states that the Soviet fighting man was defi-
nitely not a Communist fanatic. [Ref. 15: p. 234] Instead
they indicate that the normal life of the pre-war Soviet was
so hard that in some instances death could have been seen by
the Soviet as a relief. [Ref. 52: p. 9]
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staunch believer that the key to the way the Soviet fought
was firmly entrenched in his "historical experiences." [Ref.
72: p. 2] On the topic of the Soviet's seeming disregard for
life he states:
We are here most interested in the following character-
istics which we can now discern among the Russian people
as a whole: the greatest patience and endurance of
suffering , a certain inertness , and submissiveness to
life and fate , little initiative , and in many of them —
which is true of all other people to a greater or lesser
degree — an easily aroused inclination toward cruelty
and harshness which may be considered as part of the
Mongol heritage in view of the basically good-natured
disposition of the people. [Ref. 72: p. 3]
There certainly seems to be merit to this position, especially
in light of the domination and hardship experienced by the
Russian throughout the course of the country's two thousand
year history.
German writings provide numerous examples of cases in
which the Soviet demonstrated the lack of value he placed on
human life. Some of them are: (1) the policy of fighting
until the death, which was enforced by the threat of death
by the commissar, [Ref. 72: p. 16] (2) the Soviet tactic of
using Soviet civilians in front of Soviet armed troops to
draw German fire and to deplete the German ammunition supply
before the Soviet troops engaged them, [Ref. 62: p. 26]
(3) the Soviet tactic of using penal battalions to clear mine
fields in a hurry by marching them through the field, [Ref.
81: p. 23] (4) the way the Soviets used their troops to build
bridges in icy rivers and roads through semi-frozen swamps,
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[Ref. 28: p. 18] (5) the way Soviet partisans executed people
only suspected of assisting the Germans, [Ref. 62: p. 52]
(6) the way in which the Soviet fighting man was continually
placed in hardship situations such as not being provided with
food or shelter, or being ordered to hide in snow, immobile,
for hours, or being made to crawl through semi-frozen swamps
in sub-zero temperatures ,* and (7) wave attacks where line after
line of Soviets would proceed toward their objective in a
seemingly never ending flow, sometimes with only the first
few lines having weapons. In these cases, the only way for
an individual in the following rows to obtain a weapon was to
get one from a dead comrade who preceeded him. The manuscripts
also pointed out that only the most seasoned German combat
veterans could withstand this type of attack for any period
of time. There were occasions when the Germans reported that
even their own well-trained troops cracked under the strain
of a wave attack and fled in panic. [Ref. 33: p. 64] From
these examples it is difficult to conclude anything else but
that the Soviets olaced a low value on life.**
*
The ability of the Soviet combatant to endure this sort
of hardship is the topic of the following section of this
chapter.
* *
The point can be raised that perhaps the Soviet fighting
man performed the way he did in the enumerated situations out
of fear of being killed by the commissar. It is difficult to
come to the conclusion that such a limited number of commissars
could send so many millions of Soviets to their death, in the
manner in which they died, if the Soviet fighting man held
life dear. [Ref. 62: p. 13]
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As the Germans observed, this type of fighting quality
was of great value to the Soviet High Command, especially with
regard to the latitude it provided in the tactics that the
Soviets could utilize. As the war progressed, however, the
Soviets used some of these tactics [especially wave attacks]
to a much less extent. This seems to have been for two
reasons: (1) because the Soviets foresaw the possibility of
running out of combatants before the war could be finished if
they continued to expend them at the rapid rate they did at
the beginning of the war,* and (2) the improvement in the
ability of the Soviet fighting man and the degraded condition
of the German Army as the war progressed made these tactics
less and less necessary. These facts not withstanding, the
knowledge of the Soviet High Command that they could count on
their troops to perform in disregard for their own lives
surely provided them with some comfort in the catastrophic
situation they found themselves.
Another quality of the Soviet fighting man that is some-
what akin to his disregard for human life, is his minimal
needs and strong constitution. These qualities will be
addressed in the following section of this chapter.
There is nothing in the German writing that indicate
that this change should be construed to mean that the Soviet
changed his opinion of the value of life. The use of mass
force remained a Soviet tactic through the conflict. They
just did not have the manpower to use wave attacks as before
\
D. PHYSICAL STRENGTHS AND NEEDS
German writings indicate that with regard to some of the
physical feats that the Soviets accomplished, the Soviets were
viewed as being almost superhuman. This observation is not
without sound basis. German writings are full of examples
that support the Soviets' ability to routinely accomplish the
following: (1) to cross seemingly impassible terrain, [Ref.
62: p. 83] (2) to survive and be a viable fighting force in
sub-zero temperatures with virtually no formal support, [Ref.
32: p. 3] (3) to be able to survive and recover from injury
that a Westerner would not be able to survive, [Ref. 62: p. 26]
and (4) to be able to exploit his surroundings for cover and
camouflage. [Ref. 81: p. 24]
One does not have to be a military tactician to be able
to understand that fighting in one's own country has advantages
and that knowledge of the land and familiarity with one's
surroundings is a plus. This, however, is only a portion of
what the German manuscripts said about the physical abilities
of the Soviets. Rather, when the Germans addressed why the
Soviets were able to accomplish feats such as the ones just
enumerated, the consensus of opinion seemed to rest in the
position that the Soviets were just basically exceptionally
hardy people whose constitutions and life experiences
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conditioned them to endure greater physical hardship than most
any of the German soldiers could have endured.*
The German soldiers contended that the Soviet's consti-
tution, which enabled him to survive on far fewer "comforts"
(food, shelter, protective clothing) than the German soldier
required, when combined with his familiarity with his sur-
roundings made the Soviet fighting man a very mobile and
viable force to contend with as seen in the following:
The frugality of the Russian soldier was beyond German
comprehension. The average rifleman was able to hold
out for days without hot food, prepared rations, bread,
or tobacco. At such times he subsisted on wild berries
or the bark of trees. His personal equipment consisted
of a small field bag, an overcoat, and occasionally one
blanket which had to suffice even in severe winter
weather. Since he traveled so light, he was extremely
mobile and did not depend on the arrival of rations and
personal equipment during the course of operations.
[Ref. 32: p. 3]
The following two quotes from the German manuscripts show
the feelings of the Wehrmacht in general with regard to the
physical abilities of the Soviet fighting man that allowed
the Soviets to perform the feats in combat he did:
In order to complete the description of the fighting
qualities, mention should be made that the Russian
soldier ordinarily possesses a robust constitution
,
can endure unusual fatigue and privations , and is very
frugal ... [This is because] an overwhelming portion of
the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits..."
[Ref. 72: p. 17]
*
An argument could be made here that the Soviet did not
have any special ability in this area, but that he only acted
out of fear of the repercussions of failing to obey his orders
However, despite the fact that fear must have played a part
in the Soviet's actions, it is difficult to conclude that fear
made the Soviet, a survivor. It could have made him rake a




In World War II, as in preceding wars, the Russian
soldier demonstrated that he was closer [to the land]
than his west European counterpart. This was hardly
surprising since most of the Russian soldiers were born
and raised far from big cities. The civilian occupation
of the typical Russian soldier was that of a farmer,
lumberjack, or huntsman. From early childhood he had
been used to covering long distances across the difficult
terrain, orienting himself by conspicuous features on the
ground, by the stars, and often by following his natural
instincts. The manifold dangers that were present in the
wide-open Russian countryside were bound to sharpen his
senses. . .particularly his sight and hearing. Even the
city dwellers, most of whom had only recently been trans-
planted to the densely populated cities. .. remained rela-
tively close to nature. Being attuned to the vast open
spaces and desolate steppes with which a large part of
his country is covered, the Russian did not know the
depressing loneliness and forlorness that often over-
whelmed the German soldier. The Russian was accustomed
to getting along with a minimum of comfort and equipment
under climatic conditions that imposed severe hardship
on the invader.* [Ref. 81: p. 19]
In the practical senses, the Soviet's quality of being
strong, and able to exploit his surroundings for sufficient
food, shelter, and cover to meet his minimal needs, was a
valuable asset to the Soviet High Command. The fact that the
High Command could be relatively assured of having men capable
of performing their assigned missions, even though the Soviet
Army was able to provide them with only minimal support must
have been a positive factor in the eyes of the Soviet High
Command. Further, the high mobility of a unit that results
when its rear area support can be dispensed with, is further
j.
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enhanced by the fact that once there is no greater amount of
comfort available to the fighting man's rear, he might just
as well fight ahead, since there is nothing to retreat to
anyway. In this regard the Germans made the following
observation:
The psychological aspect is also interesting. Every
Western soldier is linked somehow or other with his
rearward services; they bring the sustenance and comforts
that make his hard life bearable. When a unit is rubbed
out in battle the survivors usually cluster around the
field kitchen or the baggage train to seek refuge and
solace. Even the shirker or the shellshocked reappears
at this focus on one pretext or another. There is
nothing like that for a Russian. He has only his weapons,
and there are no attractions for him in the rear. There
is no field kitchen and no baggage train; his refuge is
his gun, his tank, his machine gun. If he loses them he
has lost his home. If he wanders into the rear he will
be rounded up sooner by the patrols of the M.V.D.
(Ministry of Home Affairs). Their High Command has a
deep understanding of the Russian soldier and his
contriver to turn his weaknesses into strength.
[Ref. 62: p. 304]
One observation of the Soviet's mobility that resulted from
his ability to survive and fight without the rear area suppor 1
that the Germans associated with traditional armies can be
seen in the following:
The Russian accomplished the move of strategic concen-
trations or shifts of large units, one or more armies,
in an unbelievably short time with the help of the
railroad. . .The number of trains necessary per unit was
less than for any other army. The Russian neither had
not needed baggage or accessories, clerk's bulky lockers,
surplus vehicles, or large food supplies. He could be
packed in railroad cars like sardines in a can... In
any event... the Russians succeeded in surprising the
German command, since such rapidity in large scale troop
movements ... contradicted all experiences.
[Ref. 63: p. 23]
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These observations, however, should not be interpreted
to mean that the Soviet fighting man was totally without needs
or feelings, only that because of many reasons he was able to
endure more than the Germans could themselves, or thought to
be reasonably within the ability of the average fighting man.
German writings show that by November of 19 42, the
Wehrmacht had demonstrated some measure of understanding of
the Soviet's quality of strength and self-sufficiency. [Ref.
32: p. 48] However, the manuscripts also imply that it was
certainly to the detriment of Germany that the Wehrmacht had
failed to recognize the strength of the Soviet fighting man
in this area from the first day of the war. At first, the
Germans not only underestimated the physical condition, but
also the ability of the Russian to exploit his surroundings
for food, shelter, and camouflage. This led the Germans to
make some calculated tactical errors that were very costly.
Expecting that the Russian would be as susceptible to the
same hardships and restrictions of terrain and weather as
German soldiers were, the Wehrmacht planned accordingly, and
frequently found itself quite surprised by the Soviet counter,
as seen in the following account:
When in February, 19 4 4 [average temperature about 15
degrees ?.], a yawning gap opened on the Pripyat River
[350 miles southwest of Moscow] at the boundary between
Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group center, the
Russians crossed this extensively marshy region during
the muddy period, with 14 divisions, and pushed toward
Kowel. Several of these divisions turned south toward
Rowne to attack Lwow. Stopped near Dubno on the Ikwa
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River by the German Fourth Panzer Army, they vainly
tried to take the few strongly manned crossings over
the extensive swamps on both sides of the river.
Nevertheless, one morning a Russian battalion appeared
in the rear of Dubno. .. Interrogation of captured Soviets
revealed that during the night they had crawled on their
bellies across the slightly frozen marsh, which was up
to 600 yards wide and could not be crossed on foot.
[Ref. 62: p. 83]
Even once the Germans began to better comprehend the
capabilities of the Soviets in this area, there was still
some things the Wehrmacht had little power to stop. One of
these was the night operations the Russians conducted with
such great success. This success was primarily attributed
by the Germans to the Russian's knowledge of the land and
not any tactical prowess.
In March of 1942, the 269th German Infantry Division was
about fifty miles south of Leningrad and was being subjected
to heavy Russian infiltration:
One morning at daybreak Markayevskaya, a village located
about two miles behind the front along the only communi-
cations route, was suddenly attacked by approximately
600 Russians coming from the rear. .
.
The presence of the Russian force had not been observed
by any component of the German division, but it was
assumed that the enemy battalion had effected a night
crossing of the Markayevskaya swamp, considered
impassable at the time. Thus, there was a combination
of elements, such as the cover of darkness, infiltration
tactics, and difficult terrain, which the Russians
exploited time and time again. [Ref. 31: p. 24]
There were also accounts of Russian soldiers laying in
deep snow for hours (up to ten) , without being able to raise
their heads or move their bodies, lest they give away their
hiding places. They would do this to either be able to
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surprise and kill an unsuspecting German passing by their
position or to be in position for an attack. [Ref. 32: p. 31]
Examples such as these, and the hardships endured by the
Soviet fighting man involved in missions such as the con-
struction of "corduroy roads"* and wooden bridges in icy
rivers** seem to leave little doubt about his ability to
fight under extremely adverse conditions and endure hardship
beyond what the Germans determined to be reasonable.
The results of this quality of the Soviet fighting man
can be seen as twofold: (1) As a positive asset for the
Soviet High Command which allowed them latitude in their
tactics which they would not have otherwise had, and (2) a
negative factor that detracted from the success of the
usually well conceived plans of the Wehrmacht.
It does not seem difficult to conclude that this quality
of a strong constitution, minimal needs and his ability to
exploit his surroundings of the Soviet fighting man was a
valuable asset to the Soviet Union and that it probably
played a key role in the country's survival of the first
year of the war.
*
Roads constructed to allow semi-frozen swamps to be
crossed, by falling trees in the swamp and then dragging
them into place manually.
* *
The bridges were constructed about two feet under water
so as to avoid their being observed and destroyed from the
air by the Germans.
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Up to this point in this chapter the qualities of the
Soviet fighting man that have been addressed (ability to
learn, initiative, value of life, and physical strengths)
all answer the question of how did the Soviet accomplish
what he did. The following section, however, will address
the why of the Soviet's actions, specifically, what were the
Soviet's motivations that enabled him to accomplish those
combat actions that seem beyond the norm.
E. MOTIVATIONS TO FIGHT
From the examples provided in the first four sections of
this chapter, it is not difficult to deduce that there must
have been one or more very compelling factors that acted in
consonance with the previously addressed qualities of the
Soviet fighting man, that spurred him to perform in combat
the way he did. Although it is clear that the Soviet in
World War II combat displayed several qualities that the
Germans observed as being out of the ordinary and which very
positively contributed to the accomplishment of the goals
of the Soviet High Command, the zeal with which these
qualities were applied indicates that the success of their
operations rested in something beyond the quality itself.
Although the qualities of the Soviet fighting man that have
been previously addressed have for the most part been
described as ''innate" in the Soviet by the Germans, it should
be made clear that these are generalizations which carry
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with them all the plusses and minuses associated with any
generalization, and that these tendencies are not present in
every Soviet in exactly the same amount. None-the-less the
performance of the Soviet fighting man in combat showed far
more consistency with regard to these qualities than might
reasonably be expected. What was it, then, that stimulated
the Soviet combatant to partake in feats of such extraordinary
caliber as the one previously enumerated? Ones that con-
tinually surprised and impressed the Wehrmacht. The answer
from the German manuscripts clearly seems to be that he was
highly motivated .
There were many things that the Germans saw as the
motivating factors behind the actions of the Soviet fighting
man. There was his: (1) love for "Mother Russia", which was
presented as perhaps the most basic underlying motivation by
the Germans, [Ref. 47: p. 64] (2) hate for the Germans, which
was fanned by both German atrocities, and Soviet propaganda,
[Ref. 62: pp. 90,91] (3) fear of being captured by the Germans,
which was based not only in the fear of what the Germans
would do to him as a P.O.W. , but also that he would be
regarded as a traitor by Soviet officials if he was ever able
to return to the U.S.S.R., [Ref. 6: p. 14] and finally (4)
fear of the punishment for failure to obey his orders or for
retreating. [Ref. 72: p. 16]
Although the manuscripts present these four reasons as
being mutually supportive, the two motivators to which the
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Germans devoted the greatest amount of attention and attribute
the greatest effect, was the Soviet fighting man's love of
country and his fear of the consequences of his failure to
obey or retreat. The observations of the Germans on the
topic of the Soviet's fighting for his homeland can be seen
in the following:
He is not an active Communist, not a political zealot.
But he is - and here we already note a decisive change
(from World War I) - a conscious Russian. . .who fights
only in rare cases for any political ideals, but always
for his fatherland. [Ref. 26: p. 9]
Also:
The motive of fear may have been the final resort in
difficult situations, but basically the Russian had
no less national - as distinguished from political -
patriotism than the soldiers of western armies, and
with it comes the same source of strength. Unceasing
propaganda has burned nationalism into his soul. And
however impervious he may be to foreign propaganda, he
nevertheless has been unable to escape the engulfing
waves of his own. [Ref. 62: p. 13]
In Section B of this chapter the role of the "Company
Commissar" as the administrator of punishment was addressed
3y the end of 19 42, however, under the direct orders of
Marshal Timoshenko, the system was discontinued, at least
in its formal sense.* Since most all of the commissars had
considerable practical combat experience, they were
commissioned as officers in the Soviet Army and continued
*
Marshal Timoshenko' s reasoning for the discontinuance
of the commissar system lay in the fact that he felt the
commissars were overstepping their bounds by demanding to
counter-sign all tactical orders. It had nothing to do with
their treatment of the troops.
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their role, but now as officers. The importance attributed
to the motivational role of the commissar by the Germans can
be seen in the following quote:
I feel convinced that it was the commissar who held
together and rescued the Russian Army after its numerous
defeats and reverses in 1941, or that he at least played
a decisive role.
The commissar exerted an extremely powerful influence on
the behavior of the soldiers in combat. In defensive
operations the commissar was right back of the lines,
and shot everyone who turned back. Even commanders who
gave orders to retreat were shot down. Ke also saw to
it that the soldiers in the trenches were always ready
for action. Whenever we were able to take the Russian
positions with less than the usual effort and made an
unusual number of prisoners, we could generally take
for granted that the commissar had been either killed
or evacuated after being wounded. [Ref. 72: p. 16]
For the most part, the commissar was viewed as a political
fanatic, who held the Soviet Army machine in his tight grip,
and was a cause for concern for any who did not mirror, at
least in a token sense, his zeal.
The Germans have reported numerous examples of battles,
such as Posyolok Taytsy, Brest-Ltvosk, Stalingrad, Moscow,
and Luga, where in their opinion it was the direct influence
of the commissar that provided the impetus for the Russian
soldiers to act as bravely as they did, as in the following:
In September, 1941, long after the castle of Posyolok
Taytsy [south of Leningrad] had been taken, and strong
German troops units had been drawn up in the castle
park, German tanks passing near the park wall with open
hatches drew single rounds rifle fire from close range.
The shots were aimed at the unprotected tank commanders
who were looking out of the turrets. Not until three
Germans had been killed by bullets through the head did
the passing tank unit realize that the shots were coming
from a narrow trench close under the park wall 10 yards
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away. The tanks then returned the fire, whereupon all
13 occupants of the trench met death. They were the
officers of a Russian regimental headquarters, grouped
about their commissar who fell with his rifle cocked
and aimed. [Ref. 62: p. 15]
While it is true that the vast majority of the obser-
vations made by the Germans about the Russian commissar
address incidents involving fear and death, such as the
example of the commissar shooting the tank company commander
noted in section B of this chapter, it is important to note
that fear was not the only motivational tool the commissar
made use of. The manuscripts indicate that he had a sound
understanding of what made up the "soul" of the Soviet
fighting man. He understood their strengths and weaknesses,
and knew to use those strengths and weaknesses to their best
advantage. The previous section discussed the lack of formal
support provided the Soviet combatant. The following quote
demonstrates how the commissar attempted to gain the confidence
of his troops by his care for their well being and his own
personal example:
The attitude of the common man toward the commissar was
conditioned not only by fear of his power, but also by
his personal exemplification of the soldier and fighter.
His concern for the welfare of the troops also deter-
mined to a large extent his relationship with the men. .
.
[Ref. 23: p. 14]
As the war progressed, more and more of the Soviet
officers became aware of the methods of the commissar to
motivate the troops (fear or otherwise) and applied them with
considerable success. [Ref. 72: p. 14] German manuscripts
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noted that as the officers gained combat experience, developed
proficiency as leaders, and discarded the equalizing attitude
of the Bolshevist ideology which was undermining discipline,
he was better able to assume the role previously occupied by
the commissar. [Ref. 70: p. 14] This also meant that, he
was then better able to motivate the Soviet fighting man, to
obtain from him in combat the optimal application of his
skills and abilities.
Motivation then might be seen as the quality of the
Soviet fighting man in World War II that brought together
all his other qualities and that made him as valuable fighting
force to the Soviet High Command as he was. It does not
seem unreasonable to assume that the Soviet High Command was
aware of the fact that their troops could be controlled and
directed so as to make the best use of the skills and
abilities that resulted from the qualities already discussed
in this chapter. Further, it is apparent that they were most
interested in the expulsion of the Germans from the Soviet
Union, and were only interested that the Soviet Army could
accomplish this mission, not the means by which they were
motivated to do this. If fear of death at the hands of
another Soviet was necessary to spur the Soviet fighting man
on, especially into the face of certain death from the Germans,
when love of country or the protection of loved ones was
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insufficient, then that was what was to be done.* As
mentioned before, the High Command's knowledge of the ability
to compel their men to accomplish the feats that so frequently
surprised the Wehrmacht , certainly must have provided the
High Command with some latitude of tactical choice that they
otherwise would not have had. Early on in the war, this may
very well have been one of the very few assets that they had
to fall back on.
F. CONCLUSIONS
In the preceeding pages of this chapter numerous examples
of the performance of the Soviet fighting man in combat in
World War II have been presented. In their manuscripts, the
Germans addressed at least five general qualities of the
Soviet that they observed during the war, with the most
significant of those qualities being the topic of this chap-
ter. The relation between the combat performance of the
Soviet and his qualities which were examined in this chapter
seems clear, although admittedly difficult to quantify.
There seems to be little doubt that these qualities had a
definite effect on his performance in combat, but due to the
extreme complexities that emanate from the very nature of
war it is not possible to evaluate precisely how much these
*
Motivation of this type may perhaps not appear quite so
harsh to the modern reader if one recalls the methods utilized
to maintain discipline and motivation in the British Military,
particularly the Royal Navy, before World War I.
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qualities effected his performance. This, however, should
not be seen as detracting from the value of this information,
especially since even the Soviets view war as not just a
science, but also an art. There are some segments of a war
or combat situation that just are not quantifiable, such as
the motivations or resolve of the combatants, which time
after time throughout history have been viewed by many as
key factors in the victory of "underdog." Nonetheless,
these segments should not be ignored by a military commander
because they are too difficult or nebulus to deal with.
In the specific case of the Soviet fighting man in World
War II, there seems to have been five most significant
qualities that the German writers focused upon, with all
five being somewhat mutually supportive. German manuscripts
indicate that these qualities made a meaningful contribution
to the Soviets 1 ability to delay Germany's eastern advance.
Had the Soviet fighting man not had the constitution to
endure extreme hardship and still be a viable force, or the
ability to support himself and exploit the land or his
attitude toward the value of life, it could be questioned
whether or not the Soviet Union would ever have been able to
deter the Wehrmacht long enough for the momentum of the war
to shift in favor of the U.S.S.R. These basic qualities of
the Soviet fighting man accomplished this by assisting in
providing the Soviets with time to organize their offensive
against the Wehrmacht, for the Soviet Army to proceed with
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the reorganization it started in 19 39 and for the Soviet
conscript and High Command to gain combat experience and
improve their combat performance.
The motivations of the Soviet fighting man also contri-
buted to the Soviet Union's ability to stop the Germans.
Whether it was his love of country, or of family, or hate
for the Germans, or his fear of punishment for failure, the
German writings certainly portrayed the Soviet as being
"inspired" to accomplish his assigned mission. To the extent
that these qualities were "innate", it might then be deter-
mined that these qualities, or some more modern version of
them may still apply to the Soviet combatant, at least as
the untrained recruit. While it is true that over forty
years have passed since the beginning of World War II and
that there have certainly been societal changes in the
U.S.S.R., it might also be noted that because of the closed
nature of the society and the lack of mobility of the general
population of the country, there may have been fewer societal
changes in the Soviet Union than many other nations have
experienced during the same time frame.
The point of this is simply that there seems to be no
reason to believe that the Soviet: has completely changed and
that these qualities can no longer be seen in the Soviet
military man or the traditions which he emulates. Further,
even if these qualities were suspected to no longer be
present in the Soviet fighting man today, knowledge of them

would still be of value since they were the qualities the
Soviet displayed the last time he fought in major combat.
It would stand to reason, especially in light of the emphasis
the Soviet military puts on the value of the combat lessons
of World War II, that the Soviets [perhaps even with the help
of some Wehrmacht Officers] would have been able to recognize
the strengths and weaknesses that they displayed during the
war, and attempt to capitalize on the former and minimize
the latter. [Ref. 73: p. 29]
The following chapter will address the qualities that
the Soviet Officers Library series and the Voyenno Morskoy
Flot senior officers say in Morskoy Sbornik (the Soviet Naval
Digest) are important for the Soviet Naval Officer of today
to have to be victorious in combat. These qualities then
can be combined with the qualities enumerated in this chapter
to provide a better perspective of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Soviet Navy so as to allow for a better
intelligence estimate of their capabilities in combat.
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III. THE QUALITIES DESIRED IN THE SOVIET
NAVAL OFFICER TODAY
Victory in contemporary warfare will be won only by an
Armed Forces consisting of physically fit and hardy
personnel who are utterly devoted to the Party and the
Soviet people, who are disciplined, and who possess a
high degree of general and specialized training.
S.G. Gorshkov
CinC Navy
Sea Power of the State
The main task of [Soviet] naval educational institutions
is to train ideologically convinced, highly qualified
officer cadres who are imbued in a spirit of Communist
awareness , who have deep theoretical knowledge and
practical skills in their speciality, who are capable of
training their subordinates skillfully, and who can
operate equipment with technical competence, organize
combat actions properly, exercise firm direction of
subordinates in a difficult situation, and successfully




These quotes from two of the most influential officers
in the Soviet Navy very clearly and succinctly articulate
the most important qualities that the leaders of the Voyenno
Morskoy Flot expect from their officers.
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a marked
increase in the emphasis Soviet military writing has placed
on the role of the Soviet Naval Officer in fur.ure combat and
the qualities that officers would need to possess in order
to be victorious in ccmbat. It is the purpose of this
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chapter to enumerate and examine the qualities that two
sources in Soviet military literature, the Soviet Officer's
Library series and Morskoy Sbornik , address as those qualities
most necessary for that combat victory in the future. In the
concluding chapter of this paper, these qualities will be
combined with the Soviet combat qualities that were observed
in World War II by the German military, in order to provide
a compilation of Soviet combat qualities, both observed and
desired, that will assist in providing of an estimate of what
the Soviet Naval officer's strengths and weaknesses in future
combat might be.
In December of 1964, Voyenizdat , the publishing house
for the Soviet Ministry of Defense, announced that a series
of books entitled the Officer's Library was forthcoming. A
total of seventeen books were issued in this series, with the
first appearing in 1965 and the last in 1980. This series,
which was first published in Moscow, was translated into
English and republished in the United States under the auspices
of the U.S. Air Force. All seventeen of these volumes either
directly enumerate the qualities the Soviet military leaders
desire in their officers or their antithesis. They also
discuss in depth, topics considered to be essential to the
performance of Soviet military officers. Since the books in
the Officer's Library are designed to provide information for
all Soviet military officers, for the purposes of this thesis,
they will be used to provide information on those general
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qualities that the Soviets see as being necessary for all
their officers.
Various Soviet journals also regularly deal with the
qualities necessary for the Soviet officer today. The one
that specifically addresses the qualities most necessary for
the Soviet naval officer is Morskoy Sbornik , the Soviet Naval
Digest. Also published in Moscow by the Soviet Ministry of
Defense and translated by the U.S. Naval Intelligence Command,
Morskoy Sbornik is the modern continuation of a professional
improvement of Soviet naval officers. The works included in
this digest are chosen by an editorial staff from the articles
submitted by Soviet naval officers. Although being written
by a senior officer is not a formal prerequisite for an
article's inclusion, the author of the greatest number of
articles between 1979 and 19 80 was Admiral of the Fleet
Gorshkov, and over eighty percent of the fifty two articles
written explicitly on the qualities desired in the Soviet
naval officer in Morskoy Sbornik between 19 76 and 19 80 were
written by Soviet Navy captains (first Rank) of flag officers.
The specific qualities addressed in the Officer's Library
or Morskoy Sbornik as being the ones necessary for the Soviet
naval officer today are the ones that Soviet military leaders
and VMF senior officers view as the ones that will allow him
to perform (ultimately in combat) in a way rhat will satisfy
the requirements of the Soviet Government and the VMF.
Although neither the Officer's Library nor Morskoy Sbornik

ever make a statement in precisely these terms, evidence
indicates that the senior VMF officers are desirious of
having officers that are well trained professionals who are
capable of performance that the VMF and the Soviet government
can have confidence in, especially in situations when guidance
from their seniors is not available.
There are three basic reasons that contribute to this
desire: (1) the VMF ' s changing role in the Soviet military
and Soviet foreign policy, (2) the problems that have in the
past been associated with the decreased ability of the VMF
to control their ships at sea as closely as they would like
to, and (3) the high expense of the modern Soviet Navy.
Because of the increased emphasis the Soviets have placed
on the role of ballistic missile submarines, the need to be
able to quickly deploy troops and equipment to remote areas
of the globe, and the desire to have a vehicle of non-hostile
power projection, the Soviet Navy has found itself in a
situation where their ships are spending a greater amount of
time away from home port than almost ever before. In recog-
nizing that the very nature of war has changed and that one
should be prepared to fight the conflict only with the assets
that are already in place, the Soviets have also recognized
the fact that their commanders must be ready to act inde-
pendently if a conflict starts unexpectedly. Further, as the
role of the Soviet Navy expands into the quazi-diplomatic
realm which is encountered more frequently with the increased
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number of foreign port visits, the VMF sees a need for their
officers to always be ready to act in the best interest of
the Soviet Union and project a positive image. [Ref. 101:
p. 2] Whether in wartime or peacetime, however, the vulner-
ability to failure or disruption of any communication system,
which links the ship's commanding officer to the guidance of
his senior, seems to be a prime factor in the VMF's desire
for a professional naval officer who can act independently.
As the pace of naval action increases, the Soviet naval officer
is also no longer guaranteed the ability to consult with his
seniors about his desired course of action, and therefore
has a greater share of the burden for timely and accurate
decision making placed upon him. [Ref. 102: p. 1]
Another factor that contributes to the VMF's desire for
well trained professional naval officers is the fact that in
the past the performance of some of their officers, who have
been left to make their own decisions, has not always been
completely satisfactory. [Ref. 120: p. 56] While Morskoy
Sbornik by no means indicates that the VMF is totally dis-
satisfied with their officer's performance, the tone of the
articles seems to strongly point to their desire to see
improved performance.
The final factor that contributes to the VMF's desire
for a trained professional naval officer, capable of inde-
pendent action in the best interest of the service, is the
increased cost of a modern navy. With the primary gcal of
67

the VMF being combat readiness, and training being the primary
method of accomplishing readiness, the senior officers of
the VMF make it perfectly clear in their writing that it is
an absolute must to get the greatest amount of training
possible from every minute of underway time. [Ref. 105: p. 15]
They continue by saying that the only way this can be ac-
complished is through careful prior planning. These three
reasons then are the basis for why the VMF senior officers
see a need for their officers to be well trained professionals,
and training as the method that will be used for their officers
to become professionals who have attained a level of readiness
that will provide for victory in combat. What then are the
precise qualities that the VMF senior officers say will pro-
vide them with the officer that they desire? There were
twenty-nine discussed
. in Morskoy Sbornik. *
*
The qualities that are addressed in Morskoy Sbornik as
being the ones that senior VMF officers desire in their
officers are: (1) commands respect, (2) good C.P.S.U. member,
(3) constant, (4) sound decision-maker, (5) self-disciplined,
(6) supreme exacting, (7) good example, (8) honest, (10) in-
itiative (within bounds) , (11) modest, (12) maintains good
order and discipline, (13) historian, (14) motivates through
Marxist-Leninist military psychological principles, (15) moti-
vated by the C.P.S.U. and Marxist-Leninist Doctrine, (16) ad-
heres to Navy Regulations, (17) polite, (18) good physical
condition, (19) ready for combat, (20) self-reliant, (21) good
shiphandler, (22) technically specialized, (23) good tacti-
cian, (24) technically proficient, (25) well trained, (26)
sincere, (27) strong willed, (28) willing to do whatever is




Essentially, they can all be grouped into two categories:
(1) technical qualities, and (2) personal qualities. The
first group, technical qualities, deals with the need for the
Soviet naval officer to have a high degree of proficiency in
areas such as seamanship, engineering, weapons, computer
operational and repair, damage control, etc. The second
group, personal qualities, deals with the need for the Soviet
Naval Officer to possess qualities such as being a good
C.P.S.U. member, a sound decision maker, well disciplined,
able to maintain order, able to take independent action, etc.
While, both groups are shown as being absolutely necessary,
the second group is viewed by the senior VMF officers as the
qualities that will allow for prudent and appropriate appli-
cation of the officer's technical knowledge, readiness and
ultimately, victory in combat. [Ref. 101: p. 4]
The remainder of this paper will address the primary
qualities that are viewed by the senior VMF officers as the
ones necessary for their officers today that will allow them
to perform (ultimately in combat) in a manner that satisfies
both the VMF and the Soviet government. These qualities can
then be combined with the qualities observed of the Soviet:
in ccmbat in World War II so as to assist in providing an
estimate of what the Soviet naval officer's strengths and




The emphasis placed on the need for excellence in tech-
nical areas by the VMF cannot be over stressed. In his
Morskoy Sbornik article, "Ocean Watches", the Soviet CinC
Navy, Adm. Gorshkov writes:
. . . the potential contained in our equipment can be
realized fully only with a high degree of special pre-
paredness by the entire ship's company. It is impossi-
ble to be satisfied now by a mediocre level of training. .
.
Each [navyman] must have a detailed firm, knowledge...
at the outstanding or good level... This means an absolute
and even pedantic observance of all demands of instructors
and manuals. [Ref. 101: p. 5]
This degree of accentuation on the need for technical excel-
lence seems to permeate the Soviet writing on this topic and
is frequently mentioned as being absolutely necessary if the
level of combat readiness that the VMF has for its goal is
to be attained. [Ref. 8: p. 21]
Morskoy Sbornik and the Officer's Library address
technical excellence in basically two ways: (1) by providing
specific examples of how to be technically proficient, and
(2) as a quality that is generally necessary for the pro-
fessional Soviet naval officer.
With regard to articles providing information on specific
technical areas, Morskoy Sbornik far more than the Officer'
s
Library addresses areas such as seamanship, engineering
weapons, computer operation and repair, damage, etc. There
are frequent, brief rules of the road quizzes and essays
addressing the need for the Soviet naval officer to be a
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proficient shiphandler. In this area, Adm. Gorshkov has been
fairly critical of some number of his C.O.'s, saying that they
are careless in the way they allow watches to be stood and
the ship to be maneuvered, and that more attention should be
paid to improvement in the area of seamanship. [Ref. 102:
p. 4]
Also in this vein and directly coupled with readiness,
for combat the CinC Navy declares in several of his writings
that it is absolutely essential to maintain the VMF ' s equipment
and weapons in good working order. He emphasizes that a good
deal of their equipment is old and should be cared for as
such. [Ref. 106: p. 6] To this, Captain 2nd Rank-Engineer
Y. Andrusenko adds:
Experience shows that breakage and malfunction are not
necessarily the consequences of clear-cut, gross,
violations of the rules for operating technology and
ordnance. Even minor departures from the requirements
of operating manuals or inattention, or carelessness,
in the discharge of duty responsibilities can become
the cause of malfunctions.
For instance, aboard one of our submarines, some young
ratings preparing to start a diesel to scavenge balast
after surfacing, failed to pay attention to some fine
droplets of sea water which appeared out of the
indicator valve of one of the diesel' s cylinders.
Their failure to follow operating instructions punctu-
ally and their unwarranted haste became the cause of
a water hammer in that cylinder, and the engine had to
be repaired.
Statistics show that malfunctions are less often due
to material defects than to lack of preparedness on
the part of some specialist. [Ref. 88: p. 56]
The remainder of Captain Andrusenko ' s article showed his
solutions for these problems to be simple and straight forward.
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Officers should know their equipment, ensure instructions
are followed, and make sure that the required periodic mainte-
nance is accomplished. In this area, as in all others, if
one follows the guidance and the regulations of the VMF, he
will be well on his way to acquiring the level of proficiency
in these technical areas that the VMF requires.
One area that both Morskoy Sbornik and the Officer'
s
Library describes as being very important for ths Soviet
naval officer to be technically expert in is computer oper-
ation. [Ref. 21: p. 6, Ref. 4] The reason for the emphasis
in this area is due to their view of man's inability to
mentally keep up with the inumerable factors and the increased
pace of modern war without the assistance of some sort of a
computerized decision-making aid. This topic of man-machine
interface will be discussed later in this chapter, but let it
suffice for now to say that the VMF ' s position is that it is
absolutely necessary for the officers of the VMF to be
proficient in computer operation. [Ref. 103: p. 7] This
seems to be primarily due to the fact that without this
ability the computer is of no value to the officer. This,
in fact, might be said to be the basis for the VMF's desire
for their officer's to be proficient in all technical areas.
Without the technical ability to operate their weapons, the
weapons become virtually useless.
The reasons why the VMF has such great concern for their
officers becoming technically accomplished is the topic of
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the second type of article in Morskoy Sbornik on technical
proficiency, which deals with its general importance. It is
interesting to note that the most direct and succinct ex-
planation of this importance is provided by Adm. Gorshkov
in one phrase, "...man is... the ruler of all the weapons of
warfare. " From these ten words it seems quite clear that the
Soviet CinC's position is, no matter how sophisticated modern
weapons become, it is man and man alone who decides when and
how to use them. Without precise and operable knowledge of
how to utilize the weapons of war, they cannot be employed
in the most effective manner possible, thereby degrading the
readiness of the Voyenno Morskoy Flot .
Another area that the CinC Navy addresses as an important
reason for technical excellence is simply the ability to
survive at sea:
The long deployments of many months have become a daily
and very responsible matter for Soviet navymen. There
the personnel undergo the severest test of their ex-
pertise and of their readiness and capability to win
victory over a strong well-trained enemy in modern war-
fare. The ocean is the most demanding and objective
examiner in this respect. It is unforgiving of the
slightest defect in both the personnel's state of
training and the preparation of the ship, ordnance and
equipment for deployment. [Ref. 101: p. 3]
However, Soviet writings indicate that becoming technically
expert in the employment of Soviet weaponry is only one of
the qualities that are necessary for the Soviet naval officer
to be victorious in combat. The ability to determine correctly
when and how to employ his weapons is equally important.
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Without being accomplished in the two complimentary areas of
weapons technical expertise and the personal qualities
necessary to be able to utilize those weapons in the best
interest of the U.S.S.R., Soviet writings say that the Soviet
naval officer will not be able to meet the needs of the VMF
and the Soviet Union in future combat. [Ref. 100: p. 2]
With respect to his technical knowledge and ability and
his performance in future combat, the following may be con-
cluded: If the VMF is successful in the accomplishment of
their goal of its officers being technically expert in areas
such as weapons, engineering, damage control, seamanship,
computers, etc., then the ability of the VMF officer in these
areas is not to be taken lightly. The educational and training
programs of the VMF are certainly fully directed toward this
end. However, the fact that the VMF ' s equipment is becoming
more sophisticated at a rate which exceeds the required
adjustments in the VMF's educational programs, [Ref. 14 3]
suggests that the goal of technical expertise may not be met
at present in all areas. Unfortunately there is insufficient
evidence to project whether this trend will continue into
the future.
The remainder of this chapter will enumerate and explain
the five major personal qualities (a good C.P.S.U. member, a
sound decision maker, well disciplined, able to maintain order,
and able to take independent action) that the senior VMF
officers most frequently espouse as the ones they want their
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officers to have, and that will give the Soviet Navy the
ability to overcome the threat from the western combat.
B. A GOOD C.P.S.U. MEMBER
When conducting a review and enumeration of all the
qualities that the VMF desires in their officers, it is not
surprising to observe that being a good Communist party*
member and belief in Marxist-Leninist doctrine are stated to
be not only the most important qualities for the Soviet naval
officer to have, but also the basis for all his other desired
qualities. In July of 19 80, Rear Admiral E. Zimin wrote in
his Morskoy Sbornik article, "The Commander's Lofty Duty":
Idealogical conviction and party principle can be said
to bind together all of the qualities of a good officer
into a single whole unit. They serve as their foundation,
as the compass by which deeds and actions are measured,
against which each practical step is tested.
An officer's party conviction is based on a knowledge of
the policies of our party, the objective laws of social
development, and Marxist-Leninist science. This science
makes it possible to orient one's self correctly in
events, to learn the laws and patterns of the occurrence
and development of wars and all the changes that are
taking place in military affairs, to make sober judge-
ments about the progress of work in the unit or on ship,
and to seek constantly for ways to improve them further.
It is perfectly obvious that one of the basic indicators
of general officer development is their knowledge of
the classic works of Marxism-Leninism and the most
important documents of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet
Government. All necessary conditions have been
Over ninety percent of all the officers in the Soviet
Navy are either, members or candidate members of the C.P.S.U.
[Ref. 10, p. 343] This is compared with about ten percent
of the general population. [Ref. 16. p. 51]
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established today for the theoretical training and
ideological conditioning of command cadres. No matter
where a ship may be, at base or at sea, the officers
are constantly improving their knowledge within the
system of Marxist-Leninist training. Many of them have
graduated from or are studying in universities of
Marxism-Leninism. Cycles of lectures are given
regularly, especially for commanders. Seminars are
held for them, and speeches by progressive leaders are
frequently organized for exchange of know-how. .
.
But these large scale, so to speak, measures cannot in
any way substitute for individual work, which only
produces the desired results if it is carried on
systematically and consistently. [Ref. 141: p. 21]
This then appears to be at the heart of the matter.
Without a firm belief in Marxism-Leninism, and the objective
laws of social development which it purports, all progress
with respect to the development of the other desired qualities
of the Soviet naval officer will be retarded. The [Soviet]
Officer's Handbook * goes into this topic in great length and
detail. By use of extensive quotes from Lenin and the writings
of the C.P.S.U., the authors substantiate the Party's con-
tention that by virtue of the principles of Communism, the
Party should have complete control of all Soviet military,
and be the guiding force in their training and operation as
seen in the following: [Ref. 11: ch. 2]
The Party proceeds on the basis that while imperialism
continues to exist, the dangers of wars of aggression
will remain. The C.P.S.U. considers the defence of
the socialist Fatherland. .. and the might of the Soviet
Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the Party and the
entire Soviet People and the most important function
of the socialist state. [Ref. 11: p. 16]
*




The leading role of the Communist Party in a socialist
society also presupposes the necessity of leadership
of the Armed Forces. They are the same flesh as our
people and state, it's armed bulwark. V.I. Lenin
demanded the indivisible Party leadership of the entire
life and activities of the Armed Forces. [Ref. 11: p. 14]
The basic principle of military development - undivided
Communist Party leadership of the entire life and acti-
vities of the Armed Forces - was established on the
basis of congress resolutions on the military question.
In this connection the congress outlined for the
strengthening of Party leadership of the military, the
improvement of Party-political work in the forces, the
training of the officer cadres of proletarian origin,
and the strict application of the class principle in
the development of the army. [Ref. 11: p. 17]
All educational work with Armed Forces personnel is
based on a profound study of Lenin's theoretical
legacy, the resolutions of Party congresses, and
plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the
C.P.S.U. .
.
[Ref. 11: p. 31]
After establishing the all encompassing role of the C.P.S.U.
in Soviet Military affairs, the Officer's Handbook goes on
to specifically enumerate how Marxist-Leninist principles
are the basis for the Soviet theory of war and the Soviet
military's training and education system. [Ref. 11: chs. 3,4]
These principles are addressed in great detail in several of
the volumes of the Officer's Library series, but most particu-
larly in Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Military Pedagogy
and Military Psychology .
The emphasis the VMF places on the value of Marxist-
Leninist doctrine in the attainment of their combat readiness
goals can be seen in the unique position that the Political
Affairs Officer maintains in his unit. While it is certainly
true that the commanding officer of a Soviet naval vessel is
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in total command of his ship, the fact that the P.A.O. is not
subordinate to the ship's CO. by virtue of a separate chain
of command indicates the freedom of action to perform his
duties that the VMF wishes the P.A.O. to have. While he has
a minimal role in the formation of operational decisions, he
does play an integral part in the Soviet navy's combat readi-
ness by being responsible for the conduct of the Marxist-
Leninist intra and intra-ship competition that permeates VMF
training.
From the evidence in both the Officer's Library series
and Morskoy Sbornik it is quite clear that it is the Soviet
intention for Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the C.P.S.U. to
permeate all phases of VMF activity, and that without this
reliance on Marxist-Leninist doctrine the Soviet Navy will be
unable to accomplish its goal of combat readiness. This then
would lead to the conclusion that the philosophy of Marx and
Lenin, and the interpretation of their philosophy by the
C.P.S.U. would certainly have an effect on the actions of
the VMF officer in future combat. Even if it was assumed that
some degree of "lip service" was being paid to Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, the fact that the Soviet naval officer is
constantly surrounded by references to that doctrine it would
almost have to have at least shaped his views on war fighting
and the nature of war. This then would lead one to the need
to understand Marx-Leninist ideology and the need to analyze
the VMF officers' s actions in terms of that ideology if we
are to understand his actions.
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C. A SOUND DECISION MAKER AND ABLE TO TAKE INITIATIVE
With the advent of the age of the Soviet Fleet making
more frequent deployments of increased duration, the need
for the Soviet naval officer to be able to take sound inde-
pendent action becomes perhaps more important than ever
before to the VMF. In his Morskoy Sbornik article, "Problems
with Respect to Control of Naval Forces," Admiral Gorshkov
writes:
The fighting qualities of a navy depend to a large
extent on the development and the inculcation of new
strategic, operational, tactical, and organizational
methods for conducting naval operations. This is
one of the chief tasks of naval art. Paramount among
them is improving the methods for directing the navy.
Modern-day operations will be distinguished by the
large spatial scope, accelerated tempo, and sharp
variations in the situation during combat operations
on the seas and oceans. As a result this will lead
to the shortening of the time for decision-making by
C.O.'s and officers-in-charge at all levels and to
the increasing the demand for teamwork. .. [Ref. 102: p. 1]
Further in this article he indicates that the VMF sees the
most effective decisions in combat being made by well trained,
confident officers who are supported by computerized
decision-making aids:
Essentially new quality in decision-making today can be
achieved only by the use of automated control systems.
The revolutionary impact of introducing automated
control systems which have the indispensable S.C.S.
[special control software/spetsial ' noye matematicheskoye
obespechenyte upravlentya j is manifested not only in
increased efficiency but chiefly in creating the pos-
sibility of reinforcing the intellect of C.O.'s at all
levels while commanding under every day conditions and
especially during combat operations. . .An analysis of
the evolution reveals that under present day conditions
the importance of the control system is sharply increased.
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The primary purpose of the automated control system is
ultimately to assist the CO. in making the most
expedient decision to assure the maximum utilization
of the potential resources of the forces, and the
implementation of that decision. [Ref. 10 2: pp. 7,9]
This leads to the conclusion, which is well supported by
numerous other articles in Morskoy Sbornik and volume number
six of the Officer's Library
, Concept, Algorithm, and
Decision
,
that there is a dual nature to the VMF officer's
decision-making in combat. He must possess not only the
qualities that are traditionally associated with sound
decision-making, but also the ability to utilize automated
decision-making aids.
Concept, Algorithm, and Decision is over three hundred
pages of the Soviet view of decision-making with particular
emphasis on man-machine interface. It asserts that the
"revolution in military affairs" is currently in its third phase
and that having acquired nuclear weapons, and the means to
deliver them, the current phase is concerned with "military
cybernetics", the science of effectively controlling the
armed forces. [Ref. 5: p. v]
The motivating thesis of this book is the dramatic
increases in the speed, complexity, and data base of military
decisions, plus the multiplication of the variety and
flexibility of available options, which called for urgent
improvements in the decision-making tools for the control of
men and weapons. Its stated goal is to "contribute. .. to the
development of the theory and technique of decision-making,"
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with a particular reference to the problems of automating
the control and management of military operations. It
attempts to integrate ideas from Soviet philosophy, psychology,
social science, mathematics, and linguistics into the technical
and theoretical armory of the military commander and his staff.
While doing this, however, it is most important about the
position that the officer will always make the final decision
and that the machine is only a tool to help him assess all
the variables and options in the decision making process.
[Ref. 5: p. v]
Emphasizing the VMF ' s interest in the topic of man-machine
interface Admiral Gorshkov wrote a second part to his article,
"Problems with Respect to Control of Naval Forces," which
was printed in the June 19 80 Morskoy Sbornik . In that
article he wrote:
Control effectiveness depends essentially on the com-
pleteness and the accuracy of the analysis, on the one
hand, and on the maximum correctness (exactitude) of
the synthesis of information on the ether.
In working up decisions the officer needs to reveal
possible alternatives, that is to say different ways
to achieve objectives. .. and must be ready to use new
methodology: computer technology, operations
specialists, algorithmizaticn, and programming.
The officer must make the decision personally, but
must make good use of his staff.
The CO.'s decision, as is well-known, forms the
basis for control of forces. [Ref. 103: p. 6,7]
From these cites it can be noted how clearly the point
is made that it will be the officer who makes the final

decision in any given situation, not the automated decision-
making aid. This seems to be a fairly strong endorsement on
the part of the VMF of its confidence in the ability and
experience of the majority of its officers. This, however,
should not be misconstrued to mean that the VMF is satisfied
with the present level of performance of its officers, because
through Morskoy Sbornik it continually presents what it expects
from its officers with respect to the qualities needed to make
sound decisions, particularly in combat. For example, Morskoy
Sbornik addresses the VMF officer's need to have the ability
to make a decision without all the information necessary
[Ref. 141: p. 20], the ability to make quick decisions when
necessary [Ref. 121: p. 30], the ability to realize that
there is always some element of chance in any decision, and
to plan and try to minimize the chance [Ref. 115, p. 11], and
the ability to remember that there may come a time when he
will be the sole representative of the U.S.S.R. in a given
situation and that he must be prepared to do so intelligently
[Ref. 141, p. 19].
Morskoy Sbornik also presents numerous articles by senior
VMF officers making observations on what they think are
qualities necessary for Soviet naval officers to have in order
to make sound combat decisions, as in the following examples.
Admiral Gorshkov noted that the VMF officer must "possess a
high degree of general and specialized training" [Ref. 7],
"plan ahead and know his men," "be a superior tactician," and
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know "not only his own ship, weapons, equipment, and tactics,
but also those of his enemies." [Ref. 100, pp. 3,5] Admiral
V. Chenervin, CinC of the Northern Fleet, states that the
VMF officer must be "learning what is essential in war,"
[Ref. 93, p. 1] while Admiral N. Khovrin, CinC of the Black
Sea Fleet observes that he must always "be precise and
realistic," "know his assets and his limits," "not cover up
his mistakes," and "bold and original in his planning."
[Ref. 108: p. 62] Finally, Deputy CinC of the Soviet Navy,
Admiral V. Mikhaylin considers it important for VMF officers
to be good historians to be able to make sound combat
decisions:
It is very important to study military history more
specifically, placing basic stress on an analysis of
battles and operations, and conclusions drawn from them
which allow for finding analogs for the present day.
One must study the experience of combat operations in
a precise, logical sequence: how the situation required
one to act; what combinations were advantageous; which
techniques for employing forces and ordnance were most
effective; what mistakes were made and why, and how they
influenced success; what role was played by the CO. 's
personal qualities in combat, and others. [Ref. 117:
p. 37]
These observations seem to provide, especially in light
of the positions their authors hold in the VMF, a reasonable
indication of what it is that the Soviet Navy expects from
its officers with regard to decision making. There appears
to be, however, another quality that acts in concert with
sound decision-making, that the VMF also addresses through
Morskov Sbornik with some amount of vicor. That is the
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quality of initiative. In July 1979 Admiral Gorshkov's
article, "The Navy's Ocean Watches," appeared in Morskoy
Sbornik . In it he said the following about the CO. 's of
Soviet Naval vessels and initiative:
The extensive scope of deployments is the most typical
feature of today's Navy. The long deployments of many
months have become a daily and very responsible matter
for Soviet navymen. . .The lengthy, distant ocean deploy-
ments predetermined the need to resolve a large number
of problems in a completely different manner; problems
which were not acute previously, when deployments were
of short duration, and limited to coastal regions...
It includes an increase in the role of naval...
commanders. .. It includes the ability of the ship's
commanding officer to make an independent decision when
the situation changes suddenly in conformity of the
goal of the deployment and of observing the honor and
dignity of the state.
Ke has to resolve a large number of serious problems
on his own during a deployment and make independent
decisions on complex matters in the most varied and
at times very difficult situations.
There has also been a significant increase in the
commander's responsibility in connection with the need
to make an independent assessment of the crew's level
of training and the state of affairs aboard shio.
[Ref. 101: p. 8]
Rear Admiral E. Zimin makes a similar observation in his
Morskoy Sbornik article, "The Commanders Lofty Duty":
The ship commander when far from his native shores,
frequently for extended times, receives complete
responsibility as a full-fledged representative of
the Soviet Union. Life often forces him in such
situations to act without the advice and authorization
of his seniors. But he must act intelligently, skill-
skillfully, with an eye to the state. [Ref. 141: p. 19]
Finally, a third quote that completes this sample of what




The characteristics of the Lenin working style are
various. Very important among them are initiative and
self-reliance on the part of executives: their capacity,
when they know the total situation as well as the
ultimate and intermediate objectives, to make well-
founded decisions within the limits of their functional
responsibilities, without waiting for suggestions or
instructions from above. Initiative and self-reliance
are important criteria in the selection of cadres for
staff billets. Inertia is a poor helper on any job,
and unquestionably one cannot expect self-reliance from
an officer who will work only on orders from above.
After all, when people want to say something laudatory
about someone, they usually say: "He stands on his own
two feet." The very expression conveys that person's
independence. This trait, as a rule, is inherent in
mature individuals with the wisdom of experience.
Initiative denotes a person's inner drive to find new,
more effective modes and methods of performing tasks
in any given situation, his readiness to take upon
himself the responsibility for a decision made.
Temporizing and passivity, as a rule, lead to grave
consequences and cannot be tolerated. Shipboard
Regulations state very clearly the commanding officer's
obligation to con his ship boldly, energetically and
decisively, without being afraid of the responsibility
for a risky maneuver which is dictated by the situation.
This in my view, should be applicable to every officer. .
.
[Ref. 91: p. 49]
These quotes from three very senior Soviet naval officers
provides a very clear picture showing that the quality of
initiative is viewed as not only being necessary, but criti-
cally necessary for the VMF in 19 82. While it is true that
they focused primarily on the present day missions the VMF
must meet, the inference that this quality would also be
necessary under the circumstances of modern combat seems
quite obvious.
One observation of how to attain the quality of initiative
is made by Captain Third Rank I. Vorob'yev. This Captain
purports that watch officer training is the place that will
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make or break the initiative of a junior officer and that if
while on watch he is not allowed safe and hopefully increasing
amounts of command latitude, the officer will develop a
reluctance to act independently or display initiative that
will flaw his entire career. [Ref. 136: p. 70-75]
As with the other qualities the VMF desires in its officers;
it is much easier to determine that the VMF recognizes a great
need for their officers to be able to make sound, sometimes
independent, decisions, than it is to determine how well the
officers actually acquired this ability. Evidence in Soviet
literature makes it very clear that the Soviet Navy is quite
aware of what it wants with regard to initiative from their
officers. It is also clear, however, that the VMF does not
know to what extent the goal can be reached, or what the
quality of its officer's decisions in combat is going to be.
Because of this, and the speed and scope of modern war, the
VMF has decided to provide its officers with decision-making
assistance in the form of an A.C.S. While it is true that
this A.C.S. has two potential benefits for the Soviet Navy,
aid and control , it is quite important to note that the extent
to which the A.C.S. accomplished these two objectives is a
direct function of how good the system is, and there is
insufficient data to make a determination on the quality of
the system at this time.
As for the traditional or conventional attributes the
VMF wants its officers to have with regard to sound
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decision-making, they seem to be quite in concert with what
could be expected in a Western navy, but with greater emphasis
on the utilization of automated decision-making aids. Because
of the numerous determinants affecting the ability to make
independent decisions without the aid of an A.C.S. the
following observations cannot reasonably be termed anything
more than estimations with regard to the VMF officer's ability
to make unassisted decisions in combat: (1) the larger the
Soviet vessel, the more likely under normal circumstances it
will be commanded by an experienced officer who will have a
lessor need for an A.C.S.
, (2) the converse will probably,
but not necessarily be true of smaller Soviet vessels, due
to the relatively long tour an officer can have on the same
ship, (3) the quality of a junior officer's unaided decision-
making ability will be decreased if he has become overly
dependent on the aid or if it is teaching him the wrong
procedures, and (4) the quality of the junior officer's
decisions will improve if the aid is teaching him to make
better decisions than he would have learned to make without
the aid.
On the assumption, however, that the VMF possesses both
the knowledge and the technical expertise to make the A.C.S.
function reasonably well prior to the next conflict they are
a part of, it seems plausible to conclude that the aided and
unaided decision-making ability of the VMF officer will be
sufficient to make him capable of independently and effectively
utilizing the weapons systems of his vessel.
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D. MAINTAINS DISCIPLINE AND ORDER AND IS PERSONALLY
DISCIPLINED
The VMF addresses the topic of discipline through articles
in Morskoy Sbornik in two ways: first, there is an emphasis
on the need for good order and discipline to be able to be
victorious in combat, and second, there is a complementary
emphasis on the need for each officer to be self-disciplined
so that he can command the respect of his men, be a good
example, and make the proper choices so as to be victorious
in combat. Even though the Officer's Library series only
briefly touches on the topic of discipline directly in volume
thirteen, the Officer's Handbook, it mentions it quite fre-
quently throughout the totality of the series in various
contexts and amounts. Morskoy Sbornik directly addresses the
topic discipline frequently, and in the article, "The Commanding
Officer and Military Discipline, Naval Aviation Colonel Y.
Nelayev seems to summarize the VMF ' s position on the need for
good order and discipline in the Soviet Navy. He writes:
The essentiality of good discipline is dictated by the
very nature of the military organization. An army, as
all well know, is formed for the purpose of waging
armed conflict and it is unthinkable without discipline.
Discipline cements the ranks of fighting men, welds
them into an integrated entity, and helps them to carry
out successfully the missions assigned to them. Without
it there can be no Armed Forces ready to combat an
aggressor. .. Strict compliance with rules and regulations
and daily routine, faultless execution by seamen of
their watch-standing duties and responsibilities,
observance of rules for stowage of materials, etc— all
this directly affects combat- readiness and helps to
create a highly developed feeling of collectivism and
comradeship. .. The degree of combat-readiness is
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conditioned by the level of discipline and efficiency
of our fighting men. [Ref. 121: pp. 30,31,36]
Also in this article, Colonel Nelayev points out that the
motive for the maintenance of discipline must be sincere and
not just for show. It must be administered fairly and equally
to all, and never in a capricious or frivolous manner, and
the absolute necessity for Soviet Naval Regulations to be
complied with. He concludes his article with the observation
that without discipline one cannot expect full utilization of
the abilities of Soviet navymen and that only individuals of
"high moral position" themselves will be able to maintain
the discipline necessary for victory in combat.* [Ref. 121:
pp. 34-37]
Another Morskoy Sbornik article which addresses the value
of strong discipline to the VMF is "Firm Military Discipline
is a Guarantee of Improving Combat Readiness," by Vice Admiral
V. Sidorov. In it he says:
The fundamental transformation in military affairs has
caused the role of discipline in maintaining combat
readiness of troops to grow immeasurably. . .V. I. Lenin
pointed out the inseparable link between combat
readiness and military discipline more than once. He
considered discipline as the main link in the overall
chain of missions. If one grasped this link it would
be possible to drag the entire chain along and suc-
cessfully solve the vital problems of combat readiness
for the army and navy. In order to win, thought our
leader, iron war discipline is needed. He urged "not
from fear, but from conscience, carry out all laws of
For other Morskoy Sbornik articles on good order and




of the Red Army, all orders, maintain discipline in it
in any way possible. . .Military discipline is the found-
ation of combat readiness and a guarantee of success
in. .. carrying out the duties which face the fleet. And
the more we do for the further strengthening of discipline,
the more powerful and combat capable our fleet's ranks
will be. [Ref. 128: pp. 14,22]
From this quote and the previous one from Colonel Nelayev,
the importance of strong military discipline to the VMF is
made quite clear. One opinion of how to reinforce discipline
is provided by Rear Admiral Butuzov in his article, "Drill
Educates the Fighting Man," in which he writes:
In the overall system of comprehensive education of the
fighting man, an important place is occupied by drill
training. It is an organic part of all subjects of
military training and inculcates personnel with self-
control, smartness, precision of actions, sharpness of
appearance, and a keen feeling of collectivism, and
also promotes instilling such traits as obedience to
superiors, precision in carrying out an order, and
self-discipline. . .Drill training is not a goal in
itself... it forms habits... In combination with other
elements of training and education drills, drill
training makes a significant contribution in raising
combat readiness. It is not without reason that people
say: smart in formation, strong in battle.
[Ref. 92: p. 36]
According to Morskoy Sbornik and the Officer's Library
series, a contributant to the maintaining of discipline is
the Soviet naval officer's ability to exercise psychological
influence over his subordinates. In volume number seven of
the Officer's Library
, Military Pedagogy explains how the
Soviet military should go about training its men in accordance
with Marxist-Leninist Ideology. In volume eight, Military
Psychology
, in an almost Machiavellian fashion, purports to
orovide the Soviet officer with all the information he needs
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to psychologically control his subordinates and to bring them
to a state of readiness required to fight both nuclear and
conventional wars. [Ref. 20: p. viii]
As one would expect, the authors of articles on this topic
in Morskoy Sbornik take a somewhat different approach. In
general, this approach seems to be one that, while certainly
addressing most all of the areas written about in Military
Psychology
, covers them in a much more "personal manner, and
in a way that is directly applicable to the Voyenno Morskoy
Flot. These Morskoy Sbornik articles still provide the naval
officer with the information needed to control and direct his
men and even how to control himself. However, they are
presented in a positive and productive "leadership" context,
rather than a manipulative context. This is perhaps because
these articles are written by fellow, although usually very
senior, naval officers who are interested in telling other
officers about the "Art", not just the "Science", of being a
naval officer. While the authors are certainly not shy about
pointing out the shortcomings of some of the VMF ' s officers
(usually by name) [Ref. 129: p. 55] most of the time is spent
on the positive results that can be accomplished by using
good military psychology. They discuss topics such as the
psychological value of a strong wardroom, how to encourage
J.O.'s to learn how to be good O.O.D.'s, why is it important
to be demanding and helpful to your subordinates, the
importance of recreation, and so on. [Ref. 101: p. 7]
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It is through the application of military psychology as
derived from Marxist-Leninist philosophy that the Soviet naval
officer, according to the VMF will be better able to train
and lead his men to victory in combat. [Ref. 20: p. 1] One
individual who could be considered by the VMF to be well-
equipped to accomplish this at the present is the Soviet Navy's
Political Affairs Officer (P.A.O.). It is his responsibility
to be highly informed about the C.P.S.U. and Marxist-Leninist
Doctrine, and to conduct the units political indoctrination,
insure political motivation, enthusiasm, and inspiration of
the men, and to be attuned to the welfare and morale of the
crew. Further, he is to serve as a reminder of the value of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine and by keying on the individual's
love for his country and by providing frequent reminders of
the Soviet's heroic acts during the Great Patriotic War
(WW II) , he is to embolden the Soviet sailor to endure the
hardships of life at sea.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there are
two ways that the VMF addresses the topic of discipline,
with the second being the need for self-discipline. Although
alluded to and mentioned several times in the quotes already
presented in this section, the following observations and
examples by First Deputy of the Main Staff, Admiral P.
Navoytsev, directly states the value and need for self-
discipline and the consequences of not being disciplined:
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A thorough, detailed study of mistakes and blunders
(on the part of officers) permits a very specific
conclusion to be drawn. They occur chiefly not only
because of insufficient training of some commanding
officers , as it appears at first glance, but also
because of their personal lack of discipline and a
dulling of their sense of responsibility. It is not
just the young commanders just recently appointed to
the position who take false steps, but also those who
already have a certain amount of experience in control
of a ship. [Ref. 120: p. 55]
He then presents an example of the cost to the VMF of officers
who knew better, but were too lazy to take proper action:
The commander of a Baltic Fleet hydrographic vessel
had a rather good knowledge of the navigation safety
control measures. But relying on his own experience,
he scorned the accomplishment of all prescribed
measures and the ship went aground on a rock shelf.
This is to say, this occurred not because the commander
omitted something or did not have time to foresee
something, but because he crudely violated the require-
ments of the Navy Shipboard Regulations, where the
duties of the ships commanding officer are defined very
precisely, including those of ensuring navigation safety.
Such an attitude toward the matter is especially
intolerable since it will definitely lead to the most
undesirable consequences...
Everyone understands that our omissions do not occur
out of malicious intent... The fact is, however, this
does not make it easier from an objective standpoint.
A deficiency will remain a deficiency and we will have
to pay the full account for it in battle, without any
allowances for our good intentions. This is why we
so vitally need supreme exactingness.
[Ref. 120: p. 56-61]
Another area in which self-discipline is discussed in
Morskoy Sbornik is the need for the Soviet naval officer to
be able to maintain emotional and psychological self-control.
This is presented as becoming increasingly important as the
duration of VMF cruises increase, and with the increased
pressure that results from making combat decisions under the
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conditions of modern war. In "The Navy's Ocean Watches,"
Admiral Gorshkov wrote:
The lengthy, distant ocean deployments predetermined the
need to resolve a large number of problems. .. [including]
the inevitable abrupt increase in psychological and
physical stress on personnel and a requirement to explore
scientifically substantiated standards for intelligent
proportioning of training and rest and for methods of
alleviating tension and instilling the habit of over-
coming the hardships of lengthy deployment life stead-
fastly with the consideration for continuous assurance
of requisite readiness. [Ref. 101: p. 5]
In "The Commander's Lofty Duty," Rear Admiral E. Zimin provides
an example from the Great Patriotic War that demonstrates the
dangers involved when an officer no longer has the ability to
control his emotions in combat. He said:
The story of submarine M-172...is deeply imprinted in my
memory. During one of its combat cruises, the commander
of the "little fellow" demonstrated his weakness. He
thought he saw danger everywhere. Now and again he would
take evasive actions although there was no enemy in the
region. On the return to base, mistaking friendly air-
craft for enemy, he ordered an emergency submersion near
shore. The commander lost control of himself and panicked.
It was only thanks to the great skill and self-control
of the commander of battle station number five (engineering
department) and other crew members that the ship was able
to surface and return to base.
Contemporary naval battle is sometimes called, and not
without reason, a duel of intellects. And the commander
who can achieve victory in such battle [must be]
courageous and self-controlled. [Ref. 36: p. 20]
The value and need for discipline, both order and self-
discipline, for the VMF is quite clear in Morskoy Sbornik
,
and it would seem that the Soviet navy has the ability to
achieve its goals in this area. The maintenance of order in
the VMF seems reasonable, particularly in light of the
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authoritarian nature of life in the Soviet Union, however, the
affect of increased travel and the opportunity to visit
countries with high standards of living should also be
considered. As there are more opportunities for the Soviet
navyman to observe other ways of life, there would seem to
be an increase in the chance for dissatisfaction with the
Soviet system to arise. If this occurs, it could become
increasingly more difficult to maintain the standard of order
and discipline the VMF desires. In the realm of self-disci-
pline and self-control, it would seem that as the utilization
of automated decision-making aids increase in the Soviet navy,
the ability of a VMF officer to maintain self-discipline and
self-control could also increase. This would be due to the
fact that the automated decision-making aid could increase
the officer's ability to maintain self-control in high stress
situations, since he would be able to receive immediate
guidance and assistance from the automated control system
that is alleged to be the guidance he would receive from his
seniors for that situation. Clearly the extent to which this
quality can be attained by each VMF officer will affect his
actions in combat. If he is able, through whatever means,
to remain calm and think clearly during battle, and to
maintain control of the situation and his men, he will be a




In the preceding pages of this chapter numerous examples
have been presented of the qualities that the Soviet Navy,
through Morskoy Sbornik , has promulgated as the ones it
desires its officers to have so that they will be victorious
in combat. In their writings, the senior VFM officers address
at least twenty-nine qualities which in their opinion are
necessary for their officers. While it is certainly true
that all twenty-nine are not of direct interest to the analyst
making an estimate of the VMF officer's strengths and weaknesses
in future combat, they are still of value since they are the
qualities that the VMF purports as the ones that will bring
or maintain the Soviet Fleet's readiness to an acceptable
level.
It should also be kept in mind, however, that these
qualities are ones that are desired, and that all VMF officers
will not be able to display equal ability in these areas.
Little evidence is available to assist in the determination
of the extent to which each VMF officer has acquired these
qualities.
However, when trying to make this determination, the
following points may be considered of value: (1) the typical
VMF junior officer comes from a family background where being
a Soviet navyman is a tradition, [Ref. 106: pp. 3-12] (2) the
typical VMF junior officer has completed a Soviet higher
naval school, [Ref. 139: pp. 1-4] (3) the educational level
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of the VMF junior officer prior to entering the Soviet Navy
seems to be higher than his counterparts in most other Soviet
military services, [Ref. 126: p. 22, Ref. 137: p. 26] and (4)
the course of the VMF is directed completely toward the
attainment of an acceptable level of combat readiness. [Ref.
100: p. 2] From these four points could be concluded that the
circumstances of the officer's disposition to succeed, his
educational ability and potential to learn, and the emphasis
of the VMF on readiness, are all in favor of the VMF officer
eventually being successful in the acquisition of the desired
qualities.
The key word here is eventually. From their writing, VMF
officers clearly indicate that they are most desirous of
combat readiness now. They also indicate that they are aware
of the fact that there are some impediments to this, such as
the experience level of junior officers, that will only
improve with time. This is not to say that they are not
intent on making junior officer training as comprehensive as
possible, only that they seem to understand that there are
certain limits to what it is going to accomplish.
One indication of their concern in this area (perhaps
because of the large number small vessels in the VMF commanded
by junior officers) could be the VMF extensive interest in
automated control system (A.C.S.). These computerized decision-
making aids could certainly be of great value in guiding the
junior officer until he fully gains the desired qualities.
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A.C.S. would also be helpful in insuring that the lessor
experienced junior officer was teaching his juniors correctly
in accordance with VMF desires.
Once the VMF officer reaches a competent level of
experience, the A.C.S. would also be of great value by pro-
viding the commander with information that would assist him
in making combat decisions. It whould be noted, however,
that there is no reason to consider that an A.C.S. would
necessarily be utilized by the VMF only to control or only
to assist the decision-making of its officers. During normal
utilization, it would seem that an A.C.S. would provide both.
With regard to the specific qualities desired by the
senior VMF that have been addressed in this chapter the
following observations are made: (1) because of the emphasis
placed on technical training in the VMF, special consideration
should be given to the VMF officer's knowledge of his weapons
and their capabilities, his aircraft, ship, or submarine,
and its capability, and the capabilities of his enemy's
weapons, aircraft, ships, or submarines, (2) because of his
orientation toward a way of thinking that is influenced by
Marxist-Leninist ideology, it is valuable to be familiar with
that ideology since it will assist in the interpretation and
understanding of the rational behind the VMF officer's actions,
(3) because of the advent of automated control systems, the
decision-making ability of the VMF officer will most likely
be improved, though evidence indicates that it will probably
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be more standardized, and finally (4) because of the stress
placed on the importance of discipline and self-control in
the VMF, it could be anticipated that the VMF officer would
be inclined to follow his orders to the letter in combat,
despite the consequences.
While it is certainly unreasonable to expect that all the
qualities desired by the VMF in its officers will be exhibited
to the same extent by all officers, so is it unreasonable to
expect that these observations will equally apply to all VMF
officers. However, to the extent that an estimate of how
these qualities will affect his performance in combat can be
made, these observations are valuable.
In the following chapter, the qualities observed of the
Soviets in combat in World War II, will be analyzed in com-
bination with the qualities desired by the VMF today. The
result of this analysis will be an estimate of some strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet naval officer that could affect




After the war the Russians were without a doubt most
anxious to learn from the experiences of the long war
and utilize these lessons for the establishment of
basic principles of command, the training of officers
and men, and in the organization of their units. It
is certain that numerous German officers cooperated
in this matter and helped to uncover certain Russian




In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet
Armed Forces. .. acquired a wealth of combat experience...
This experience has not lost its significance even under
today's [altered] conditions. Careful study and appli-
cation thereof .. .helps admirals, generals, and other
officers to perform effectively their tasks which have
to do with increasing combat-readiness and perfecting
the expertise of units and forces.
Admiral of the Fleet of
the Soviet Union
N. Smirnov
First Deputy CinC Navy
Morskoy Sbornik, May 19 79
It is the purpose of this thesis to identify some fighting
qualities that could be expected from the Soviet naval officer
in combat by virtue of the emphasis placed on them today in
Soviet hortatory literature and in the written observations
of the Germans on the Eastern front in World War II. When
used in conjunction with intelligence data, the information
presented in this thesis should assist in the estimation of




The writings of Soviet naval officers in Morskoy Sbornik
very clearly support the observation that the VMF views the
"experience of war," particularly the Great Patriotic War,
as an invaluable teacher. In Soviet literature, repeated
mention of the value of real combat experience, the need to
be a knowledgeable historian, and the need to simulate combat
as nearly as possible, are made. Morskoy Sbornik further
emphasizes this point through a regular section in that
publication entitled "Pages of History," The VMF leadership,
through Morskoy Sbornik , has also quite clearly indicated
their firm grasp of the principle that there has been a major
change in the way future wars will be fought compared with
World War II, and that although many basic combat principles
proven in that war remain valid, they must be implemented
with due concern for conditions today. [Ref. 139: p. 5]
Although it is never explicitly stated in Soviet literature,
it is interesting to note the often close relationship be-
tween the observed strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet in
combat during the second World War and the qualities the VMF
presently states as being necessary for its officers to have
in order to be victorious in combat. From their writings,
the senior VMF officers appear to be fully aware of Soviet
combat errors during the war and intent upon insuring that
they are not repeated by their officers in the next conflict.
The VMF ' s adamant position on readiness certainly seems
to have stemmed from the lessens the Soviets have learned from
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the Great Patriotic War. It is dogmatically presented by the
Soviet CinC Navy as being the singular most important goal
of the VMF and that all assets should religiously be directed
towards being ready for whatever may come. The responsibility
of the CO. in this area is repeatedly addressed with emphasis
on how he must do everything in his power to insure his command
is always prepared for all contingencies. The resolve with
which this topic is written about in Morskoy Sbornik is such
that it seems to show the Soviets as saying: "Never again
will we be surprised as we were in the Great Patriotic War.
We now see the tremendous cost in life due to our unpreparedness
in that war, but it will be nothing to the losses we can
expect if we are caught unaware by the West in a nuclear
attack. We must therefore always be ready, no matter the
cost," This thought seems to permeate the Soviet Navy's
thinking fairly equally at both the tactical and strategic
levels in Morskoy Sbornik . It is peacetime training, which
replaces wartime experience, that is to make this readiness
a reality at both levels. The World War II literature showed
that the Russian did learn from, and improve with, experience,
and the Soviet emphasis on training today undoubtedly seeks
to provide them with as much experience as possible.
The remainder of this chapter will enumerate the qualities
which could be expected to be exhibited by the VMF officer
in future combat. This will be done by comparing the qualities
observed of the Soviet in combat during the Second World War,
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since they provide the most current information on his actual
combat performance available in the West, with the ones
recently presented in Morskoy Sbornik and the Officer'
s
Library series as being necessary for the Soviet naval officer
to be victorious in future combat.
The Soviet naval officer's ability to take initiative and
independent action can have important consequences for the
outcome of a future war. On this topic, Germans clearly point
out a serious lack of initiative and independent action on
the part of the Soviets, particularly during the first years
of the war. The Germans saw this quality as being innate in
the Soviet fighting man and indicative of the nation in
general. While it is difficult to determine whether or not
these qualities are in fact innate, it has been argued
that the nature of the Communist System as instituted in the
USSR, is one which discourages individual decision-making and
encourages communal or collective decision-making and the
reliance on seniors for guidance.* It is extremely important
to note, however, that the Germans emphatically differentiated
between the ability of upper and lower echelon Soviet officers
in this area, stating that the senior officers seemed more
capable in this regard and that their abilities in fact
improved as the war progressed.** The present day VMF
See Hedrick Smith, The Russians, (N.Y.: Quadrangle
Publishing, 1976)
**
Admiral Gorskhov, who was a Rear Admiral during W.W.II,
is leading the VMF today in its efforts to insure its officers
are capable of sound, independent decision making.
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leadership recognized, however, that due to the increased
scope and pace of modern war: (1) all officers will need
assistance in making combat decisions in the future, and
(2) that inability or failure to act independently when
necessary in future combat could have potentially grave
results, i.e. damage to or destruction of the vessel. To
overcome these problems the VMF has undertaken a program of
equipping their ships with automated control systems (A.C.S.)
to assist its officers in decision-making, and to provide
scope and limits to their actions. While it is true that
the A.C.S. will not function any better than its software,
if it is assumed to function reasonably well it could
accomplish the following with regard to the VMF officers'
ability to take initiative and independent action: (1) pro-
vide with a better understanding of the common goals, the
intentions; and the framework under which his seniors are
functioning, (2) reduce the fear of the less experienced
officer to act independently, (3) increase an officer's
ability to solve more complex combat problems in less time,
and finally (4) increase and improve the decision-making
ability of the "average" naval officer, at the expense, how-
ever, of the potential "Nelsons" in the fleet. In general,
then it can be said that the A.C.S. could improve the VMF
officers' ability to take initiative and act independently,
while providing the senior officers of the Soviet Navy with
some sense of assurance that lower officers will not overstep
104

the bounds of initiative. This then would seem to indicate
that the VMF officer could be able to meet the requirement
for independent action which will be necessary in future
combat, and at the same time be relatively assured of acting
in consonance with the desires of his seniors.
The second quality is the VMF officer's technical pro-
ficiency: The German manuscripts provided numerous pointed
accounts of the physical strengths of the Soviet fighting
man in World War II. In Morskoy Sbornik , today the VMF
exhibits a discernible deviation from the World War II lesson
of the value of superior physical ability. The emphasis is
on the more important need for VMF officers to have superior
mental ability to be victorious in future combat. This seems
to be based on the Soviet understanding of the change in the
nature of war, and that one does not need to have any great
amount of physical ability to fire a missile from a ship. He
does, however, need to be technically highly skilled to be
able to most effectively utilize all his weapons.
With respect to his technical knowledge and ability and
his performance in future combat, the following may be
concluded: If the VMF is successful in the accomplishment of
their goal of its officers being technically expert in areas
such as weapons, engineering, damage control, seamanship,
computers, etc. , than the ability of the VMF officer in these
areas is not to be taken lightly. The educational and
training programs of the VMF are certainly fully directed
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toward this end. However, the fact that the VMF ' s equipment
is becoming more sophisticated at a rate which exceeds the
required adjustments in the VMF ' s educational programs,
suggests that the goal of technical expertise may not be met
at present in all areas. Unfortunately there is insufficient
evidence to project whether this trend will continue into the
future.
The third quality that could affect his performance in
combat is that he is a Communist. The Germans mentioned love
of country more than love of Communism as motivating Soviet
performance. They also emphasized fear as a motivator and
placed great importance on the role of the commissar as a
critical asset to the Red Army, especially during the first
year of the war. These men were described as political
zealots without consicence, who were quite proficient in
leading troops, and that because of their absolute dedication
to Communism, they pursued their assigned misions with
unequaled fanaticism. Through intimidation they forced others
to follow their lead. While only about six percent of the
general Soviet population today are members of the C.P.S.U.,
about ninety- five percent of the VMF officer corp is, and the
current emphasis placed on the extensive integration of
Marxism-Leninism philosophy into everyday VMF life is a firm
indication of the Soviet Davy's professed dedication to the
national ideology. It should be noted, indeed, that there
is far greater stress today on the VMF officer being
105

motivated by belief in the system and his ability to motivate
through reason rather than fear than there was during the
Second World War.
While it is not possible to determine the depth of the
Soviet naval officers belief in Communism and how it will
affect his combat performance, the following points seem
worthy of consideration. First the political leadership
today, as it did in World War II, relies heavily on the
individual's love of country and family, and hate for the
enemy, and takes great advantage of these qualities by
continually reinforcing the officer's responsibility in these
areas. Second, regardless of the extent of the officer's
personnel belief in the system and his conscious desire to
conform the fact that he has probably spent his entire life
in an environment that espouses Communism and Marxism-Leninism
would surely seem to at least shape his way of thinking.
Finally, the fact that he is an established member of Soviet
society, presumably leading a relatively comfortable life,
gives him a vested interest in the system, regardless of his
personal political beliefs. From these points it can be seen
that the VMF officer's combat performance may be affected in
two ways by Soviet Communism: (1) that it will directly or
indirectly provide him with motivation to be victorious in
combat; and (2) it will provide him with a psychological,
perhaps even subconscious, framework within which he will make
his combat decisions. In light of these points, the need
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to be familiar with the precept of Communism, in order to
understand and predict the actions of the VMF officer in
combat seems clear.
The fourth quality of the VMF officer which will affect
his performance in combat is his discipline. While the
German authors generally wrote with substantial criticism of
the lack of initiative on the part of the Soviet fighting
man during the War; they were also quite clear on the value
of the iron discipline they observed from the Red Army. In
their writings today, the senior VMF officers are absolutely
emphatic about the necessity for strong discipline if the
Soviet navy is to be victorious in future combat. However,
it appears that they believe that more than just pedantic
adherence to orders is required to meet the challenge of the
speed and scope of modern war. This can be seen in the even
greater emphasis they place on their officer's ability to
act independently. When the two qualities of discipline and
initiative are properly combined together in a VMF officer,
particularly one who possesses a high degree of technical
proficiency and is "assisted" by an A.C.S., the picture cf a
formidable naval officer begins to emerge.
Underlying all the qualities specified above is an emphasis
in present Soviet literature on the VMF officers dedication
to his mission and victory. This dedication was made most
obvious in World War II by the Soviet's apparent disregard
for the value of human life in the quest for victory. In
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their writings, the Germans unmistakably pointed out how
continually astounded they were at the Soviet's disregard
for life, and especially the manner in which the Soviets
employed their troops and the latitude of action this dis-
regard afforded the Soviet High Command. While it is not
possible to prove to what extent this attitude remains in
the VMF officer corp today, the importance the Soviet navy
places on dedication and victory is quite apparent in current
writings. To the extent the wartime tradition of willingness
to sacrifice life for combat victory remains in the senior
Soviet naval officers, it could allow them options in future
combat that a western naval officer might perhaps not view
as reasonable because of unacceptable losses to the Soviets,
thus rendering the western officer vulnerable to surprise from
"unreasonable" VMF action.
When one combines all the previously enumerated qualities
together two things become very clear: (1) the Voyenno
Morskoy Flot learned a great deal from the errors of the
Soviet fighting man in the Great Patriotic War. (2) The
Voyenno Morskoy Flot learned a great deal from the errors of
the Soviet fighting man in the Great Patriotic War. (2) The
Voyenno Morskoy Flot through writing demonstrates its sincere
interest in correcting these errors and their intention to
avoid their repetition. It is the author's contention that
the meaning of this is as follows: There is a large difference
between intentions and results. VMF leaders have shown that
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they understand what qualities they want from their officers
and why. If most Soviet naval officers could attain these
qualities, they would be formidable adversaries. The more
they attain, the more formidable they become. Whether they
can in fact do so is another question altogether. It appears
that education and training are the ways the Soviet naval
officer will be exposed to these qualities. In light of the
extensive military training and educational system of the
Soviet navy, it seems that the attainment of these qualities
is certainly possible.
Reason, however dictates that we do not exaggerate the
degree to which Soviet officers will attain the ideal desired
in Soviet writings. The magnitude and scope of the goal may
place it out of reach. Every Soviet naval officer cannot be
a Gorshkov. Most will have shortcomings forever. In 1950,
German Generaloberest Erhard Raus wrote of the Soviet military
which had just defeated his nation:
The Red Army was successful in the last war, a good
argument for the proposition that in a future war,
fought under equal or similar circumstances, it would
again emerge victorious. The high command was good and
in its hands the troops, purely as human mass, were a
useful instrument. The prime motive force behind both
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